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A NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
The Arabi~ alphabet and its transliteration symbols are presented on the following page. I 
have confined the use of diacritical marks to those Arabic terms that are not used very 
frequently in English literature. Hence, I have chosen to omit their usage in commonly 
known words such as Qur'an, Shari'a, and 'ulama, except for the symbols(') and(') which 
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A Critique of Contemporary Islamist Political Philosophy 
with Specific Regard to the Concept of Islamic State 
ABSTRACT 
The Islamist/fundarnentalist movements of the twentieth century, such as the Jama' ate Islami 
of Pakistan, the Ikhwan al Muslimin of Egypt, and the FIS of Algeria, have committed 
themselves to the ideal of attaining an 'Islamic state'. In their quest for the realization of this 
objective, they envisage a total mobilization of Muslim societies in accordance with "the 
Islamic shari'a law" under a universal state. The main architects of this ideal of Islamic state 
in recent times have been Sayyid Abu al-A'la Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb. 
This thesis is an attempt to appraise these Islamist theories of statehood and governance in 
the light of traditional juristic theories of governance as well as modern and postmodern 
forms of democratic political formations. In this thesis I assert that the contemporary Islamist 
political blueprint, like traditional Muslim political philosophy is geared towards the 
establishment of Gemeinschaft (community) in the traditional sense, and not Gesellschaft 
(society/state) in the modern s~nse. State in the modern sense is to be understood as a 
complex form of social organization and public power that has authority independent from 
any particular office holder such as a king. The modern state is an association between the 












regulate social arrangements and social relationships. 1 It encompasses various diverse 
groups, a multiplicity of religious communities, and largely disparate interests, under certain 
broad common goals. 
It is also a contention of this thesis that while Islamist political ideology condemns and 
challenges modernity and its modem forms of political and social organization, it has itself 
acquired very 'modem' traits of power, control, and statehood. It is further asserted that the 
juristic model of state, upon which the Islamist worldview is selectively based, is incapable 
of functioning as a power polity in the world of territorial states. 1 
1It should be noted at the outset that the writer of this thesis supports the freedom 
struggles of the Palestinian people, as well as the struggles of the Muslim masses in other 
parts of the world against state tyranny, oppression, the denial of basic human rights and 
liberty, and the suppression of democracy, be they in Muslim countries or non-Muslim ones. 
What this thesis attempts to critique, is the ideological stance pf those 
'Islamist/fundamentalist' movements that have become the 'vanguards of Islamic resistance', 
with reference to how they envision replacing the contemporary regimes in Muslim countries, 














Through human history, many civilizations have been bedeviled by contestation and 
confrontation between two forces. The one force being that of the governmental or political 
authority, and the other being the force of religion represented by ecclesiastical authorities. 
A study of history will reveal that politics and religion have been very intimately related, and 
politics influences religion as much as religion influences politics. But what is politics, and 
what is religion? 
Politics and governance are: 
usually understood to refer to the accumulation, organizati n, and utilization 
of power in a region, territory, or society--especially the power to govern, to 
decide who controls the common institutions of society and on what terms. 2 
Politics is about power, influence and authority. Power entails the mobilization of muscle, 
numbers, weaponry, and force, at times coupled with the influence of wealth and 
intelligence. Even if power is understood to be a combination of force and influence, it still 
requires legitimacy in the eyes of the governed, with respect to a particular basic vision of 
the world that it possesses. If a political force is perceived to be illegitimate, serious attempts 
will be made by the subjects to resist that force. Many a times, this basic vision or 
world view is provided by religion. Hence, religion prescribes the limits of authority. It also 
provides the contours of acceptable wisdom, and defines which interests and which forms of 
· · rationality are to be given approval and which are to be repressed. These are fundamentally 
shaped by a governing metaphysical-moral vision. 3 
However, religion cannot remain oblivious to political ambitions, for many a religion 
was succeeded or relegated to the dustbins of history, depending on the political patronage 












particular region. Religions are also sometimes spread by political conquest. 4 
Defining religion seems a more elusive task. For practical purposes, it could be said 
that religion refers to those engagements that pertain to the holy, or the interaction that takes 
place betWeen humans and a metaphysical being, what Rudolf Otto referred to as "the idea 
of the Holy. "5 In other words, that system of teachings and principles that pertains to those 
objects or beings that are venerated and worshipped by humans. It is also at the same time 
a system of formalized doctrine that serves as a source for morals and values. A system of 
ideas and beliefs which binds certain members of the human race into a common worldview, 
a common identity, and a social glue, in a particular manner that is believed to enjoy 
supernatural origins and supernatural sanction and support. Or, as referred to in popular 
jargon within Muslim circles, that Islam was "a way of life", a system of thoughts and 
beliefs that provides a 'complete framework for living', and not just the performance of 
rituals and liturgical practices. 
But is there really such a strict divide between the political and the religious realms? 
This thesis is premised on the assumption that all areas and branches of life are 
interconnected, and that no one part is really separate from any other. We are interconnected 
in a such a system that, whatever happens in any part of the system reverberates throughout 
the system. All of life is profoundly interconnected and interdependent just as cells of a large 
body are intricately connected. 6 
In any event, it is these two major sub-systems, politics and religion, that make ever-
competing claims of legitimacy upon their human subjects and make demands for obedience 
and adherence to their respective laws and institutions. On the one hand, the religious sphere 
has its representatives (the 'ulama. and the sufis in the case of Islam), who make particular 












propagate a specific vision with regard to what would be considered to be good, what would 
be considered to be morally sound, and what would be considered to be just and fair in the 
course of social interaction. 
Side by side with the religious visionaries, one finds other human actors in the 
equation, who conjure up alternative d~signs and visions of what constitutes the good life, 
pleasure, prosperity, happiness, justice, evil, exploitation, immorality, etc. These 
'alternative' actors may be motivated by anything from philosophical, to 'rational', or 
cultural, personal, or even particular sectional interests, in the determination of what is fair, 
moral and just. 
The various actors represent diverse interests and motivations. For example, business-
people may have a particular vision of things that represent primarily economic interests, 
such as the maximization of profit or economic prosperity. Property-owners may bear the 
primary concern of the security of private ownership. Others may be concerned with the 
plight of human suffering, destruction of the environment, problems of violence, unequal 
distribution of resources, etc. Yet others may be preoccupied with political matters and 
matters of governance, and the maintenance of law and order, for which they contemplate 
specific ways of dealing with the issues that they confront. 
It does not mean that people are strictly compartmentalized, for it is possible to have 
a religious vision and at the same time carry out political or economic functions, and 
intermingle various precepts from various sub-systems. For example, it is possible to find 
. one political ruler who has a more 'religious' bent to the way he governs, while others may 
not give much consideration to a particular religious norm or code. In the same way, while 
one business-person may organize his/her business activities on purely economic pragmatism 












regard to a religious code of ethics in his deliberations. 
However, since the advent of colonialism, industrialization, and the resulting 
'modernization' of life-styles, matters have become more complex. The various sub-systems 
that make.· up human life have asserted greater independence from particularly religious 
precepts. So while in traditional times, there was a great deal of integration between politics 
.. 
and religion, and economic and religious policies, in the modem world there appear to be 
greater attempts to dislodge the two from religious beliefs, customs, and taboos. 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft 
Modem industrial life and its 'rationalist' principles have posed a serious challenge 
I to every culture and civilization on earth. In an attempt to make some sense of the serious rupture that has been caused by the modem age, Ferdinand Tonnies developed the concepts 
I 
• of Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft as a central idea upon which two different modes of 
mentality and behaviour could be characterised. These concepts have been defined in various 
ways. 
Gemeinschaft has been translated as community, and Gesellschaft, as society. Some 
sociologists have defined Gemeinschaft as being a traditional type of folk community, where 
relations are based on a simple face-to-face basis. Such communities are technologically 
small-scale, with strong emphasis on family ties, and individual status and social roles 
predetermined largely by virtue of birth. or one's sex. 7 Gesellschaft is taken to be the -I opposite. It takes the form of modem society which challenges traditional patterns of ideas, 
family structures, and political economy. It has created an "impersonal, fast-moving, fast-
changing society, bound together not by ties of blood or place or friendship, but by self-
-
I 














• ' I 
• 
Gemeinschaft has also been described as natural will, that is an attitude governed 
primarily by habit, love, sympathy and fellowship, which is brotherly, comradely and 
friendly. It is also of the authoritative type, authority such as that between father and son. 
Gesellschaft on the other hand is described as an attitude that is conditioned more by rational 
will, which makes more of an impersonal relationship that is based on a contract between 
individuals, or a service contract between natural persons or collective persons whereby they 
recognize a master or head over them. This type of relationship predominates in the modern 
state. This, of course, does not necessarily mean that traditional communities were 
predominantly irrational. 9 
It should be understood that social scientists have not considered these to be absolute 
categories. It is possible to find certain elements of Gesellschaft in traditional communities, 
while certain characteristics that have been defined as belonging to the Gemeinschaft type 
would also be found in modern societies. Nevertheless, how do these concepts impact on 
contemporary Muslim politics? It is my contention in this study that the traditional theories 
of government adopted by the jurists, as well as the positions adopted by contemporary 
Islamist ideologues are paradigms which are designed and framed within the context of 
Gemeinschaft, that is in the context of a close-knit, small-scale community, based on 
relationships which are more of a personal kind. However, the reality of contemporary 
Islamic societies is that they have been plunged into a situation of Gesellschaft with regard 
to how they wish to choose their leaders, how they wish to pursue socio-economic 
development, and how they wish to govern social relationships on the basis of a shared 
morality. This changed state of affairs demands a fresh, innovative look at current political 












Contemporary Muslim Responses 
How have Muslim societies responded to these challenges and changed circumstances? The 
one approach was that of the traditionalists, who are made up of the 'ulama, the sufis 
(mystics), ·and other pious lay-people, who could be described as 'ordinary folk'. They 
responded to the problem of modernity by practising withdrawal. They adopted a strategy 
.. 
of withdrawing from participating in the political process, and at times, even to the extent 
of avoiding any engagement in the political discourse. If they had made any contribution at 
all to the political debate, then it was only to the extent of prescribing extremely pietistic, 
and perhaps unrealistic conditions for those aspiring to political office. Apprehension towards 
the turmoil they found in the world lead them to insulate themselves from the 'corrupt world 
of politics' and concentrate on religious education and religious practices. It was a mindset 
which felt that the best thing to do under the circumstances to get on with one's work as 
Allah has commanded, and not be distracted in one's quest for eternal bliss in the life 
hereafter by what is going on in the secular world. It was, and still is a worldview that 
advocates acquiescence rather than resistance to those who possess hegemonic power, so long 
as they allow religious activities. 
This worldview, perhaps, has its origins in the political theories of the jurists. The 
juristic conception of what constitutes legitimate Islamic government, is the very first attempt 
at formulating a systematic 'Islamic' political theory. The first chapter of this thesis examines 
these juristic political theories, as well as traditional modes of succession to political 
authority in the early period of Islam. The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate the 
absence of an official Islamic political theory in the original sources, the Qur'an and the 

















In the second chapter, we look at another approach that emerged within Islamdom 
during the post-colonial period. This approach was believed by some to be one of near total 
acceptance of, and assimilation into the new order of things. This was the position that was 
adopted by the 'secularists', especially in the Middle East, such as the Ba'athists of Iraq and 
Syria, as well as avowed nationalists such as Jinnah in Pakistan, Nasser in Egypt, and 
Ataturk (one of the most renowned secularists) in Turkey. The secularists, who have come 
to dominate most Muslim polities since independence, were inclined to emasculate religion 
from influencing the political, economic, and social order of the new-found nations. They 
attempted to relegate religion to the private domain, and sought to ensure that it does not 
interfere in the process of bringing the Muslim nations into the modem age as puissant 
competitors with the already mighty Western powers, in the global arena. To some, this was 
considered to be too 'radical', in that it was prepared to sacrifice the entire Islamic heritage 
and tradition, and catapult to an undoubtedly Western, secular value-system. The opening 
discussion of this chapter is centred around defining secular democracy and Western political 
theory. Later, we look at how these Western political norms were introduced into Muslim 
lands by the 'secularly' orientated political elites such as Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt, and 
Muhammad Ali Jinnah of Pakistan. 
Chapter three of this thesis examines the third force in this configuration, the 
Islamists, or those that have been labelled by the Western media as fundamentalists. Sayyid 
Abu al-A'la Mawdudi (1903-79) who founded the Jama'at-i lslami in Pakistan in 1941, and 
Sayyid Qutb (d. 1966), who was one of the chief exponents of the Muslim Brotherhood of 
Egypt, could be described as the principal ideologues of the global Islamist movement. It is 
from these two revolutionaries that lslamists around the Muslim world take their inspiration; 














graduates of major Muslim cities who feel betrayed by modernity. 
The lslamist vision, in short, is one of rejecting certain aspects of tradition such as 
sufism (mysticism) and the cultic aspects of traditional Islam, that are seen to be accretions 
to the true .. and pristine faith, as well as politically and socially debilitating. It is felt that 
• 
1 these traditional movements were responsible for the weakness of the Muslim ummah that 
I made them susceptible to colonization by the Western powers. On the other hand, the 
lslamist movements also condemn the modern paradigms of nationalism, liberalism, and 
thoroughly Western-style democracy. The lslamist movement has taken on a puritanical 
approach, in that it claims to return to the pure Islam of the Prophet and his immediate 
suc~essors, free from accretions and innovations. 
It is this third form of response that constitutes the principal subject matter of this 
thesis, and will be discussed in chapter three, which provides a detailed description of the 
main articulations of Mawdudi and Qutb on their vision of an Islamic state. This chapter also 
defines and analyzes the key characteristics of not only 'Islamic fundamentalism', but 
religious fundamentalism in general, its utopian notions of power, and its practice of shrewd 
selectivity in appropriating certain aspects of modernity and rejecting others. 
It is the concern of th s thesis to analyze the Islamists' rejection of the notion of 
geopolitically limited states. Islamist theorists devised their political theories in response to 
what they had witnessed happening around them. They had seen the development of new 
.. 
nation-states in the Muslim world who considered themselves to be totally independent 
entities, and motivated purely by nationalistic ambitions. Such nationalistic passions, in the 
likelihood of competition or conflict between the interests of sister-states within the ummah 
of Islam, had the potential for conflict and war between people of the same faith. Mawdudi 













on nationality. He found this to be in conflict with how Muslims ought to organize 
themselves on the basis of their common faith. It is for this reason that both he and Qutb 
- -condemned nationalism as being jahili (oriented towards the pre-Islamic era of ignorance of 
divine revelation). 
I Mawdudi and Qutb, in spite of their rejection of geopolitically limited states perhaps 
I cannot be completely dislocated from their own 'nations', Pakistan and Egypt respectively. The most likely reason for their rejection of separate national entities within the house of 
Islam could perhaps be that they solicited a more preponderate or transcendent critique of 
the ruling elites. Qutb bore a repugnance towards the ruling elites of Egypt, whom he 
believed were corrupt, and instruments of neo-colonial powers who were perpetuating the 
misery and deprivation of the people of Egypt. Probably every Muslim polity since the 
1950's proved to be worthy of such a judgment. Their horrendous human rights records, 
their insensitivity to the plight of their populations, and their involvement in rampant 
corruption, provided reasonable grounds to appeal to the 'conscience of the global Muslim 
community' to mobilize against ruling cliques, and overthrow them on the basis of a 
universal Muslim consciousness that all the oppressed Muslim populations of the world could 
rally around. 
Mawdudi, Qutb, and the Islamist fold in general felt that the governing elites of 
• Muslim states did not conform to the religious criteria required of rulers of an Islamic polity. 
They were thought to be too 'secular' and worldly, and bereft of religious J.?Otivation. This 
led them to attack the very idea of a secular state, as it was believed that secular ideology 
·was essentially a ploy by the Western world to undermine Islamic societies of their tradition, 
their culture, and in fact their entire faith. Since the modem secular state's task was 













humans to legislate on issues of morals and values that have already been laid down by God 
in scripture, and in the divine law of the Sha.ri'a. 
In short, as will be demonstrated later in the study, the Islamist vision, which is a 
• very creative adaptation to modem political trends, is riddled with 'ideology' and Islamist 
polemics. What Muslim societies need is to move beyond ideology and polemics, and 
I pragmatically investigate new possibilities that would make possible the development of a 
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• CHAPTER 1 
I The Evolution of Traditional Muslim Political Thinking and Political Practice 
The purpose of this chapter is to demonstrate that in the Islamic tradition, no specific 
I directives prescribe any one particular political theory. In fact, this chapter unpacks the level 
of diversity that one finds when conducting a historical analysis of the Islamic political 
tradition. To elucidate this point, this chapter analyzes those verses of the Qur'an that are 
understood by some scholars to constitute the 'Qur'anic political principles'. I also briefly 
examine the method of succession of the Rashidiin Caliphs, Abu Bakr and 'Umar, followed 
by a brief exposition of Shi'i and Khariji political theories, and lastly, Sunni political theory 
and the role of the jurists as a particular interest group. 
What is the basis of Islamic political thinking? Are there any specific directives in the 
primary sources of Islamic knowledge that dictate any particular form of government? As far 
as the Qur'an and Sunnah are concerned, they do not contain any specific regulations 
concerning political theory as such. However, what we do find are verses which allude to 
'enforcing the command of Allah on earth'. 
For example the Qur'anic verses: "O ye who believe! Stand out firmly for Allah as 
witnesses to fair dealing." (ch. 5 v.8); and "And he commands you to judge between them 
by what Allah has revealed, and do not follow their vain desires." (ch.5 v.49); and "And 
whoever fails to judge by what Allah has revealed, they are the unbelievers. (ch.5 v.44) The 
verses do not prescribe any particular method of choosing those who will govern the affairs 
of humans. What they do contain is a principle that whoever happens to be in power, ought 













Muslim political theory stems largely from the debates surrounding the method of 
succession of the four rightly-guided caliphs (the Rashid;n). The Islamic community after 
Muhammad searched for the best qualified person in their midst. The election or nomination 
of a leader was conducted by a council of respected and notable elders, later known as the 
ah/ al-hall wa'l- 'aqd (people who loose and bind). 
In the very first case of selection that faced the newly emerging Muslim community, 
the selection of Abu Bakr, no prophetic pronouncement on how the Muslim community 
should continue the governing of their political affairs after him was cited. Sunni scholars 
later deduced that the Prophet's appointment of Abu Bakr as the leader for the prayers during 
his illness was an indication that the Prophet thought him to be the most worthy person to 
continue as his successor. However, this retrospective justification seems doubtful, as the 
Prophet had often delegated that task, and in fact even the task of running the actual affairs 
of Medina to other persons on other occasions. The only conclusion one could then come to 
is that the Prophet intended that his followers should settle the problem of succession on their 
own, if there was to be any successor at all. 1 
The most likely reasons for the general acceptance of Abu Bakr as the most worthy 
candidate to succeed the Prophet could have been that he was the closest friend of the 
Prophet and the person that was most familiar with his thinking. In addition to that, he was 
also an expert genealogist, most familiar with the Arabian tribal structures, and hence most 
effective in dealing with their tribal intrigues. He was also a man who was firm, decisive and 
yet amiable in his manner. It was good political sense on the part of the community that led 
them to appoint Abu Bakr as the leader of the Muslims. 2 His appointment was not based on 












In the case of 'Umar's succession, Abu Bakr designated him as his successor. This 
again was an unprecedented act, which found general acceptance in the community. Abu 
Baler's designation of 'Umar was not an imposition, but a recommendation that was subject 
to the apptoval of the community. Since 'Umar was also a man of great leadership qualities, 
his appointment also found popular approval. 3 
However, there arose in Islam a dissenting group called the Shi'a who had a different 
view of political succession. The Shi'a claimed that the Prophet did not leave the question 
of political succession open, and had in fact designated a person, namely his son-in-law and 
cousin 'Ali. This designation is believed to have taken place during the Prophet's last 
-pilgrimage at a place called Ghadir (pool) of Khumm, where he proclaimed that: "He for 
whom I was the master, should hence have 'Ali as his master. "4 
Besides the person of 'Ali, the Shi'i position was also based on the rationale that it 
was inconceivable that given God'sjustice and benevolence towards his servants, the issue 
of leadership (imamah) was left undecided. If God sent ma'sum (faultless and sinless) 
• 
prophets to guide mankind, then it was equally necessary for the latter to appoint such people 
as custodians of their followers, who would also be faultless and knowledgeable of the true 
meaning of the Qur'an and the Prophetic Tradition. Such candidates were best chosen from 
among those who were near and dear to the Prophet, and hence 'Ali and his male 
descendants were the best candidates for succession. 5 The Shi' is also argued that succession 
to the Prophet was not something that could be left to election by ordinary individuals, It was 
such a vital issue that only God knew who was most worthy of succession, which he then 
disclosed to his emissaries through revelation. 6 
Another political trend ~at existed in the early period of Islam was that of the 












years after the demise of the Prophet. Their rebellion was prompted by the Caliph 'Ali's 
intention to refer his dispute with Mu'awiyah to arbitration. Since they saw the dispute as 
a clear-cut conflict between right and wrong, they argued that 'hukm (the right of arbitration 
• 
and judgement) belonged to Allah alone.' In other words, they believed that the dispute had 
to be simply judged by the Qur'an. On the issue of succession, the Kharijites insisted that 
all Muslims, irrespective of their tribal, racial and class distinctions, enjoyed the right to 
elect or to depose, or to be elected or be deposed as rulers. 7 
After the rule of the rightly-guided caliphs, a new model of governance ushered in. 
The Umayyad and 'Abbasid Dynasties justified the legitimacy of hereditary rule, backed by 
the notion of the divine right of kingship. This theory existed long before Islam in the 
domains of the Byzantines and the Sassanids. According to this theory, the 'state' was a 
divine ordinance personified by the king. The king was directly chosen by, and responsible 
to, God alone. He stood between God and the people and ensured stability by maintaining 
both in their proper places. He was considered to be the 'Shadow of God on Earth'. 8 
In Islamic terms, this divine right of kingship was formulated by notions of qadr 
- - -(destiny) and khilafah (successorship). Whereas the rashidun caliphs had been regarded as 
... - -
the representatives or the successors of the Prophet of God (khalifat rasul allah), the 
-
Umayyads appear to have used the title khalifat allah (representative of God), and to have 
claimed to reign by the qadr and will of God and his vicegerents. 'Abd al-Malik (65-86/685-
705), who supported such ideas of qadr, wanted his subjects to believe that the power and 
the kingship (mulk) given to him and his family was granted by God, and was inalienable 
according to divine will. This meant that disobedience to the caliph and his subordinate 
officers was tantamount to disobedience to God, which was tantamount to disbelief. 9 












of Umayyad rulers in their personal behaviour. They accused the Umayyads of degrading the-
caliphate, and claimed to restore proper Islamic goverrunent by the family of the Prophet. 10 
As soon as they obtained power, the 'Abbasids took autocracy to its limits. They eliminated 
all opposition and assumed the role of divine kings. 
The 'Abbasids legitimated their rule as a restoration of the caliphate on the basis of 
their kinship with the Prophet in the male line. They were known in the 2nd-3rd/8th-9th 
centuries as the Hashimiyya, the descendants of Hashim ibn 'Abd Manaf. At the same time, 
the 'Abbasids also emphasized the religious nature of their authority. They claimed to be the 
ahl al-bay_t, the legitimate heirs of the Prophet, the warriors of God, and the upholders of 
his law par excellence. They wooed the 'ulama and recognised the shari'a law as the only 
legitimate norm of the state. 11 
The Role and Influence of the Sunni Jurists 
As discussed earlier, Muslim political practice evolved in a rather ad hoc manner, based on 
what could be described as "pragmatic experimentation". It could be said that the theorizing 
of Islamic political thought began with the dissentions that occurred with the advent of the 
Shi'a and the Khawarij. It was natural for those opposed to the status quo, or those deprived 
of actual political power, to theorize political thought in order to challenge the legitimacy of 
the holders of power. On the other hand, in response to those challenges, the power elites 
justified their pos'session of power in terms of the very same religious underpinnings. This 
process of legitimation and delegitimation was also undertaken by Sunni jurists during th.e 
late Umayyad and early 'Abbasid periods. 12 
The primary task of the 'ulama and the faqaha' Gurists) was to establish the 












privileged position of authority, for, behind them stood the authority of the Prophet, or, as 
in the case of the Shi'i 'ulama, the imams. The 'ulama came to be regarded as the heirs of 
the Prophet. The Sunni 'ulama. imagined their function to appraise the enactments of the 
government and the practice of the community by the standards of the Shari 'a which they 
developed. Their principal political function was to interpret revelation for the problems 
facing the community. The authority of the 'ulama. stood alongside that of the caliph, the 
bearer of authority, and the sultan, the holder of power. However, the 'ulama were not able 
to exercise effective political functions, as they did not enjoy tangible political power. 13 
The influence of the 'ulama. in either legitimating the powers-that-be or m 
delegitimating them in the eyes of the masses, was crucial for themselves. Abu Yusuf, a 
pupil of Abu Hanifa, was a prominent Sunni jurist who was the first person to receive the 
title of qQdi al-qutht (judge of judges) in the 'Abbasid court. He held that the actual 
• 
possession of power was the necessary and sufficient argument for the exercise of authority. 
He justified the religious obligation of absolute obedience to the existing authorities, citing 
the hadith, "Fear God and obey Him; and if a flat-nosed shrunken-headed Abyssinian slave 
is vested with power over you, harken to him and obey him. "14 He used it as an argument 
in defence of blind submission to authority. Similarly, Abu Yusuf records some scholars as 
saying "Nothing in the tradition permits you to take up arms against your imam." This 
obligation was not limited to a good ima.m, for he states, "If the ima.m is just, then reward 
is due to him, and gratitude from you. If he is tyrannical, then the burden of sin is his, and 
it is yours io be patient." 15 
Another key figure in the formulation of Sunni juristic political theory . was al-
Mawardi, who died in 450/1058 in Baghdad. His al-Ahkcim al-Sultaniyya is a key document 

















Baghdad, and also held the office of qadf in several towns. 16 . 
Al-Mawardi was of the view that the office of imam ought to be filled by election. 
This election had to be carried out by 'qualified' electors (ah/ al-ikhtiyar), but not by the 
community at large. Within the framework of his theory, al-Mawardi laid down certain 
qualities that he considered necessary for the electors. The first quality was 'ad.ala (i.e. a 
state of moral and religious integrity). Secondly he demanded 'ilm, religious learning, so that 
the electors would know whether the person they were electing, possessed the qualities of 
imamate; and thirdly, judgement and wisdom, so that they could choose the one who was 
most worthy of the imamate. 17 The qualities that al-Mawardi required of the imam were 
manifold: First came 'adala (to exercise justice), then, 'ilm (knowledge), and then, the ability 
to exercise independent judgement (ijtihQd). He should also possess bravery so that he could 
protect the territory of the Muslims and undertake jihad against the enemy. Mawardi also 
stipulated that an imam should be a descendent of Quraysh. This last condition was probably 
laid down to counter contemporaneous Fatimid propaganda on the question of who were the 
rightful ahl al-bayt (family of the Prophet). 18 The imam could be chosen either by election 
by the ahl al-hall wa 'l- 'aqd, which is election by the elite, or by nomination. Since 
nominating of the imam had been a common practice of the time, he sought to give validity 
to the practice. 19 Mawardi's theory was more of an attempt to justify historical political 
precedents, as well as contemporary political practices, instead of proposing changes to them. 
For al-Ghazali, politics rested on theology (usu/ al-din) and juridical methodology 
(usu/ al-fiqh). But overarching all this wa~ ~e eschatological destiny of man: this world was 
a field in which man prepared for the future life, and the object of politics was to prepare 
man for final happiness in the next world. The Sasanian maxim that din (religion) and dawlat 














was its guardian and charged with its preservation. Men needed a principle of power (sultan) 
to guide them and arbitrate in their disputes, as society was incessantly exposed to quarrels 
and conflict. But this principle of power required a norm, a qanun (law), upon which to 
• resolve the differences. This norm was provided by fiqh (jurisprudence). Thefaqih therefore 
I performed an essential function in the state. Without him, order and justice would fail. 20 
I In Ghazali's theory, the imamate was the necessary power to maintain order. Secondly, it 
• symbolized the collective unity of the Muslim community and its historical continuity, and 
thirdly, it derived its functional and institutional authority from the shari 'a. It was the only 
legitimate form of government in Islam. 21 
However, faced with the realities of political life, the austere might of the caliphs, and 
• 
I 
the practical constraints for launching successful rebellion against existing powers, the jurists 
were forced into a position of extreme compromise. They jettisoned all the qualifications that 
iii 
they proposed in theory, and justified this compromise by arguing that the alternative was 
chaos and tyranny at an inter-societal level. 
This compromise was most amplified by none other than al-Ghazali. He advised that 
the security of the faith was dependent on the security of the world, and the security of the 
world could not be assured without the existence of a ruler to whom obedience was shown. 
Civil disorder, violence, death and scarcity that accompanied the death of rulers and imams 
until the nomination of another, was proof of the fact that 'the tyranny of a sultan for a 
· ·. 1.ndred years was preferred over the tyranny that members of society would unleash against . . . 
one another in one year': The damage that would be caused by austere and absolute rule far 
outweighed the absence of such rule. The preservation of the ummah was a higher political 
value than the liberty to express an individual opinion which might lead to dissension, and 












The jurists, in order to secure religious life, legitimated the exercise of arbitrary 
power. The jurists went so far as to consider politics as an autonomous activity, which was 
no more subject to the rigorous demands of piety and good behaviour that they had initially 
subscribed to. This could be seen in the jurists' injunction that jihad (holy war) was to be 
pursued alongside all imams whatever their conduct, and that the rulers were entitled to levy 
taxes on the populace, without any questions being asked as to how they would be spent. The 
Friday prayers and other public religious rites ought to be performed by those who were in 
power, whatever their conduct or reputation.23 
However, not all scholars were supportive of the unquestioned and unchallenged 
authority of the ruler, irrespective of his track-record. Al-Jahiz, a scholar who adhered to the 
'rational' Mu'tazili school, rejected the doctrine of unconditional obedience to the imam. He 
believed that the wrong-doer was accursed, and whoever forbids the cursing of the wrong-
doer was himself accursed. He criticized those who alleged that abuse of bad rulers was 
sedition ifUna), even if these rulers terrorize the good and reassure the bad. Al-Jahiz also 
regarded knowledge as being the most marked quality that an imam should posses. 24 
Al-Jahiz's contribution to the theory of imamate is considerable. For him the imamate 
was necessary in the interests of the community, whose duty it was to provide themselves 
with an imam, even if it necessitated the overthrow of a tyrant or a usurper. Ideally, the 
imam was to possess outstanding intellectual and moral qualities. He was to be the most 
excellent (afda[) of the community.25 
• 
The common denominator that emerges from the foregoing discussion is that 
practically all the Muslim jurists were inclined to the theory of election or nomination by an 
elite. The "people who loose and bind" form the core of their political thinking. Government 















very special and exclusive task which could only be administered by special people. 
The jurists had conceived of a broad category to oversee the political process which 
they termed ah/ al-hall wa '/- 'aqd. The identification of this group remained elusive. Juristic 
literature only gives general descriptions. In the case of the caliph 'Umar, he nominated six 
persons for the caliphate and asked them to choose one among themselves. This does not 
mean that the "people who loose and bind" were restricted to those six persons. 26 Some 
-commentators of the Qur'an say that the phrase ulu 'l- 'amr (those entrusted with authority) 
which appears in al-Nisa: 59 applies to 'the people who loose and bind'. Other commentators 
believe ulu 'l- 'amr refers to the scholars of religion, namely the 
'ulama, while others understood it to refer to the rulers.27 Al-Nisaburi considered them to 
be "those of distinguished ranks and considerable opinions. "28 The number of individuals 
that constituted the ahl al-hall wa 'l- 'aqd was also in dispute. While some jurists formulated 
a certain quorum for making binding decisions, others believed that any number of the ah/ 
al-hall wa 'l- 'aqd --even a single person -- could carry out the bay 'ah (pledge of allegiance) 
as long as it was accepted by others. Those who stipulated a quorum mention the numbers 
five, three, and forty. However, the bay'ah was binding, irrespective of the number of the 
ah/ al-hall wa 'l- 'aqd who participate in it. 29 
All these juristic requirements were merely theoretical. The jurists were aware of the 
fact that those who had the power to appoint an imam did not actually fulfil the requirements 
of ahl al-hall wa 'l- 'aqd. In practice, the jurists compromised their position, considering the 
existing realities on the basis of 'um;m al-balwa (public affliction) and da:U.rah 
(necessity).30 These are two terms that have been coined in Islamic legal philosophy in order 
overcome the severity of a legal Shar' ia injunction due to public affliction and popular 












-the concept of darurah (necessity), the Muslim populace had no choice but to obey the 
rulers, even though in theory they did not stand up to the 'shar'i' or rather juristic 
requirements. The Muslim public was also absolved of the responsibility of having to depose 
an immoral ruler or a tyrant, which in principle they would be morally duty-bound to do. 
A crucial question to be asked at this stage is: what was the political motivation that 
inspired the 'ulama to prescribe such idealistic and legalistic qualifications? One likely 
answer to this question could be the notion that the political thinking of the jurists was 
fashioned by the social standing that they enjoyed in society, and also the political role that 
they were able to play at the time. To take the early period of juristic thinking, during the 
time of the Umayyads, and the 'Abbasids, it is a fact that the scholars had not yet arrived 
at a satisfactory accommodation with the state, and their political thinking was in a real sense 
utopian, backward-looking, and idealistic. 31 
However, the collapse of the early caliphate, left a political void for joint political and 
religious authority. This presented the 'ulama with an opportunity to promote their own 
image as the guarantors and guardians of he shari'a, a role that was hitherto assumed by the 
caliphate. The 'ulama exploited the void by elevating themselves over whoever now assumed 
political leadership. The political authorities were to be subservient to the advice and the 
dictates of the 'ulama class. lbn Taymiya (d. 1328) was most explicit in exalting the role of 
the 'ulama over the 'secular' political authorities. It was the 'ulama who were considered to 
be the principal actors rather than the caliphs. 32 
So, iii actual fact, the 'ulama, in their political theory, were laying the ground for 
their own preservation, rather than the caliphate. They considered themselves to be the elect 
of God, or "the witnesses of God on earth," immortalized in huge and voluminous 













and governors of cities and regions in a quite independent manner. With time, the 
qualifications of the caliphate became increasingly those of the scholar. 33 
This is proven by the way Ghazali, in the eleventh century, lowered the requirements 
for holding the office of caliph, in order to make room for any other possible candidate. 
While someone of Quraysh ancestry retained the position of caliph, the actual functions were 
taken away from the caliph and were now fulfilled by others. With the military function 
going to the Turks, the legal scholars were in effect in charge of the judiciary. In order to 
deal with political problems, good advisors, such as Nizam al-Mulk were sufficient. So, for 
Ghazali, the caliph was more of a spiritual symbol rather than a power base. The caliph was 
reduced to a figurehead of the Muslim community as a symbol of unity. All the other minute, 
detailed conditions of the office of the caliphate were shelved, as the advisors and the 'ulama 
now fulfilled those roles'. 34 
The paradox that emerges from the above discussion is that the 'ulama were involved 
in a process of legitimization as well as delegitimization of the political state of affairs. On 
the one hand, they delegitimized the status quo by criticising the caliphs for their irreligious 
practices and policies, and for their failure to live up to the Islamic ideal espoused by the 
'ulama. On the other hand, they legitimized the status quo on the basis that, notwithstanding 
all the shortcomings of the caliphs, they were more preferable in the context of the 
nonexistence of the ideal Islamic person who could assume the mantle of political leadership. 
In other words, it was a case of 'tolerating the devil you know', rather than risking the future 
of the polity by calling for insurrection against a bad caliph. Moreover, this bad state of 
affairs left ample room for the jurists. 
If one examines the political theories of the Sunni jurists, one finds that the primary 












the shari'a formed a cardinal principle of juristic political thinking. It was premised on the 
jurists' desire to secure a Muslim community that would be unified and strait-jacketed into 
following the juristic expression of Islamic life. That was the Gemeinschaft tendency that the 
jurists wished could be realized in Muslim lands. However, the jurists were but one strand 
among the many streams of thought that existed even in the classical period of Islam. Muslim 
society at the time had already acquired the character of Gesellschaft in many respects, and 
this is what overwhelmed the 'ulama dream which was hardly ever realized. The shari 'a was 
seldom the guiding principle of the state. 
The juristic theory of the Islamic state, emerged mainly, and flourished particularly 
at a time when the caliphate was weakening and withering. Juristic theory was therefore 
obsessed with trying to rescue the community from its unhappy destiny. This it did by 
overemphasizing its presumed religious character. It envisaged a utopia of how things should 
be, rather than describe how things were in reality. The jurists utopia of trying to incorporate 
the state into the shari'a was a product of their ownjuristic endeavours, since the Qur'an and 
Sunnah had very little to say about politics and the state. As the utopian idea of an 'Islamic 
state' was elaborated upon, repeated and reiterated, in volume after volume, subsequent 
generations did not view it as a mere ideal that should be aspired to, but believed it to be a 
reality that did exist. With the passage of time, as the gap between the juristic theories and 
the social and political realities widened, ironically, the juristic theory became one of the 
main intellectual tools used by the politico-religious opposition against colonial rule, and 
nationalist, secularist gqvernments, in modem times. Whatthe politico-religious organizations 
do not realize, is that the political theory of the jurists was but one of a variety of genres 
from the Islamic intellectual legacy. 35 














traditional political thinking and political practice. It has shed some light on the diverse 
approaches that were employed through different periods in Muslim political experience. In 
chapter three, we contrast this with the unilinear and utopian approach adopted by Mawdudi 
and Sayyid Qutb's notions of how the ideal Islamic polity ought to be constituted. However, 
in the following chapter, we look at the emergence and formation of the modem state in the I West, as well as in the Muslim World, as a means of coping with an even more advanced 
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The Idea of the Modern/Secular State 
Introduction 
Contemporary Islamist political thinking could be described as primarily a reaction and a 
challenge to the secular governments of Muslim countries. It is also a rejection of modern 
forms of political organization, and principles of government, on which modern democratic 
regimes are based. What the Islamist visionaries advocate is a system of government based 
- -on shura (mutual consultation) among such people who are chosen/elected on the basis of 
merit. Such merit is determined by the level of piety, knowledge of religious tenets, and 
adherence to the shari'a, by those members who seek political office. 
Since the two Islamists, Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb who form the subject of this 
study, were particularly concerned about the modern form of the democratic state, and 
directed their criticisms primarily against modern political philosophy, this chapter provides 
a brief overview of the basic foundation of the modern democratic state as it emerged firstly 
in the Western world, and then later found "its roots in other parts of the world. 
2.1 The Emergence of Modern Political Theories 
It should be remembered that political philosophy, or the art of government for that matter, 
is something that has always been debated by humans. People have argued over who has the 
right to command other fellow humans, and to what extent they should enjoy political or 
legislative authority. They also delved into the problem of the limits of obedience, and to 












being, or are certain members of society who enjoy power and authority over their human 
subjects, worthy of sovereignty? 
In response to these problems, no two societies or civilizations came to exact 
agreemen(over theories of governance. Different philosophers, thinkers, and even ordinary 
people, conditioned by different social circumstances and different historical experiences, 
arrived at different theories about how to govern human beings. Even so-called primitive, 
small-scaled, and nomadic tribes have had some form of 'government' in the sense that they 
had certain accepted rules of conduct by which law and order was maintained, even though 
they did not constitute a "state" in the modem sense of the word. 1 
Even democracy, as a modem form of government and statehood has not been without 
its various derivatives. For example, French theorists differed from British thinkers on how 
to apply democracy. Even within one country, Britain, Locke differed from Hobbes on 
theories of government and politics. Hobbes was of the idea that the ruler should enjoy 
strong powers, as this was the only way to prevent anarchy. Hobbes grew up in the years 
preceding the Civil Wars, and was obsessed with the idea of law and order. He developed 
a personal conviction that men were naturally evil and quarrelsome, and therefore had to be 
strictly controlled. His younger contemporary, Locke, saw his fellow men in a different light. 
He thought humans were naturally pleasant and peaceable, and could be trusted to govern 
themselves. He was concerned with working out methods by which people could be 
safeguarded from the dangers of the abuse of power by their rulers. 2 
With the advent of the modem state, and the relaxation of religious and metaphysical 
control that Christianity exercised over Europe, even more people began to freely debate the 
constitution of the state. Now that the very definite, absolute, and certain doctrines of the 













their minds on the issues of governmental authority and political power, the debates grew 
even more intensive. One person's theory was as valid as another's. The issue now was 
which elite group could successfully impose its political ideology, or convince the people it 
was governing, as to which was the best method of government. This is what became known 
as the secularization of politics. In other words, the dislodging of the church with its absolute 
metaphysical claims, now became the precursor to theories of state and government being 
discussed in human terms on the basis of 'rational' and empirical criteria. This secularization 
of politics should be understood as being part of a larger process of secularization in other 
spheres of life also, such as in theology, culture, and indeed the Church itself. The following 
discussion deals specifically with the issue of secularization as an overall process in a 
changing society. 
2.2 The Process of Secularization 
Firstly, we tackle the question of what do the two terms secularization and secularism 
mean. 3 How have they been defined by social scientists as well as scholars of religion who 
are addressing the problems of what has been called 'modernity' especially since the 
'industrial age'. Harvey Cox, in his book The Secular City quotes the Dutch theologian C. 
A. van Peursen who defines secularization as the deliverance of man "first from religious and 
then from metaphysical control over his reason and his language. "4 He further explains that 
"it is the loosening of the world from religious and quasi-religious understandings of itself, 
the dispelling of all closed worldviews, the breaking of all supernatural myths and sacred 
symbols." Secularization is man turning his attention away from worlds beyond and toward 
this world and this time (saeculum = "this present age"). 5 

















religion. Secularization simply bypasses and undercuts religion and goes on to other things. 
A metropolis based on secular lines does not look to religious rules and rituals for its 
morality or its meanings. Religion becomes a hobby for some, or a mark of national or 
ethnic identity for others. Religion looses its ability to provide an inclusive and commanding 
system of personal and cosmic values and explanations. 6 
Harvey Cox locates the origins of secularization as the process by which a "religious" 
priest was transferred to a parish responsibility. Such a person was secularized. Gradually 
the meaning of the term widened. When the separation bf pope and emperor became a fact 
of life, the spiritual and the secular also became institutionally separate. The passing of 
certain responsibilities from ecclesiastical to political authorities was designated as 
"secularization." Up to this day, when a school or hospital passes from ecclesiastical to 
public administration, the procedure is called secularization. 7 
This is secularization at the political level. However, political secularization soon 
brought in its wake cultural and social secularization. It followed as an inevitable result. 
Cultural secularization denotes the disappearance of the religious determination of the 
symbols of cultural integration. 8 Hence we find that political secularization had a ripple 
effect on many other areas of life, be it culture, or the determining of moral codes, or ideas 
regarding the structure of the cosmos. This does not mean that there is necessarily a linear 
evolutionary relationship between the various forms of secularization. One can occur before 
the other. However, there cannot remain a large degree of imbalance between them. 
However, religious people do not share the same positive impression of the project 
of secularism. They feel that secularization was rooted in Enlightenment philosophy, and that 
it marginalized religion and gav~ the state jurisdiction over certain affairs previously 













Nevertheless, the move towards secularism was intimately connected with nationalism. 
Certain nations wished to promote their own specific interests within a geographically limited 
area, independently from an imperial Church. The German nation for example, wished to 
establish for itself an entirely separate political apparatus without any interference from other 
institutions that happened to have their headquarters in Rome. The ecclesiastical authority 
also had a different approach to matters of everyday life that differed from national German 
aspirations. 
George Sabine portrays the emergence of the modem state in the West as being part 
of the overall evolution of Western civilization. He says that the "current secular content" 
of the modern state is a result of several centuries of conflict between the Church and the 
secular establishment over who would enjoy dominance in the state. The nation-state with 
the king as the supreme authority arose in many parts of Europe during the sixteenth and 
seventeenth centuries as a result of the revolt against the overlordship of the Roman Catholic 
Church. 9 The Catholic Church was undermined by the rise of Protestantism which 
maintained that salvation could be achieved by individuals through direct prayers without the 
mediation of the Church. Such ideas contributed towards the secularization of political 
authority. 10 
2.3 The Modern State 
"In modern Western political thought, the idea of the state is often linked to the notion of an 
impersonal and privileged legal or constitutional order with the capability of administering 
and controlling a given territory. "11 This notion of an impersonal legal or constitutional 














become a major object of concern until the development of the European state system from 
the sixteenth century onwards. Under this system, human beings as 'individuals' or 'people' 
could be active citizens of this order - citizens of their state - and not merely dutiful subjects 
of a monarch or emperor. 12 
Controversies among European thinkers around the issue of the state vis a vis society, 
attempted to grapple with the following questions: What is the state? What should it be? 
What are its origins? What is the relationship between state and society? How should this 
relationship be? Whose interests does the state represent, and whose should it represent? 
What is to be the relationship among states? 
Among the various strands that emerged in response to these questions, David Held 
has specified four major traditions of analysis in this regard: (1) liberalism; (2) liberal 
democracy; (3) Marxism; and (4) so-called political sociology. An important distinction to 
be made is the distinction between normative political theory or political philosophy on the 
one hand, and descriptive-explanatory theories of the social sciences on the other hand . 
Theorists that fall into the first category are Hobbes, Locke and Mill, who were more 
concerned with what is desirable, and what should or ought to be the case. Other theorists, 
such as Weber, focused on what was the case. Marx sometimes occupied one domain, and 
sometimes the other. However, the two camps cannot possibly be so neatly 
compartmentalized, since many political philosophers see what they think the state ought to 
be like, in the state as it is. Social scientists on the other hand, cannot escape the fact that 
facts do not just 'speak for themselves': theorists interpret them, and in fact they have to be · 
interpreted; and the framework we bring to the process of interpretation determines what we 
'see' as important. 13 














shall render a summary of David Held' s description of the four traditions below. Liberalism, 
which was the political philosophy of Hobbes and Locke, is a highly controversial concept, 
the meaning of which has shifted historically, but suffice to say that it signified "the attempt 
to define a private sphere independent of the state and thus redefine the state itself, that is, 
the freeing of civil society - personal, family and business life - from political interference 
and the simultaneous delimitation of the state's authority." 14 
With the growing division between state and society, the struggle for a range of 
freedoms and rights became more acute. Liberalism began as a concept that wished to see 
the arbitrary abuse of power being checked by the citizens who were subject to the particular 
political authority in question. It gradually became associated with the doctrine that freedom 
of choice should be applied to matters as diverse as marriage, religion, economic and 
political affairs, in fact, to all matters of daily life. Liberalism upheld the values of reason 
and toleration in the face of tradition and absolutism. It was of the view that the world 
consisted of 'free and equal' individuals with natural rights. According to the liberalist 
school, politics should be about the defence of the rights of these individuals, so that they 
may be in a position to realize their own capacities. The mechanisms for regulating 
individuals, pursuit of their interests were to be the constitutional state, private property' the 
competitive economy and the distinctively patriarchal family. Attention at this stage was 
primarily focused on the male property-owning individuals. The Western world was not yet 
liberal democratic or democratic, in that it did not yet grant universal franchise to all mature 
adults. 15 
The second school, that of liberal democracy, was that of Jeremy Bentham (1748-
1832) and James Mill (1773-1836). For them: 
liberal democracy was associated with a political apparatus that would ensure 












government would there be a satisfactory means for choosing, authorizing and 
controlling political decisions commensurate with the public interest, that is, 
the interests of the mass of individuals. 16 
They believed that it was only through the vote, secret ballot, competition between political 
leaders, elections, the liberty of the press, speech and public association, that the interests 
of the community in general could be sustained. Nineteenth-century liberalism was 
engineered to ensure the conditions that were necessary for individuals to pursue their 
interests without the risk of political interference, to participate freely in economic 
transactions, to exchange labour and goods and appropriate resources privately. The state was 
to play the role of umpire or referee while individuals pursued, according to the rules of free 
exchange, their own interests. It was believed that the collective good (utility) would be best 
achieved with minimal state interference. Although the state's scope and power had to be 
drastically minimized in this regard (i.e. economic exchange), it was expected to intervene 
in other spheres such as punishment for disobedient behaviour, whether it came from 
individuals or groups or classes. Why was this so? Because it was thought that such deviant 
individuals or groups, by challenging he security of property or the market society, 
undermined the realization of the public good, and therefore should be punished. Prisons 
became the hallmark of this new age. So, whenever laissezjaire was inadequate to ensure 
the best possible outcomes, coercive state intervention and the creation of draconian state 
institutions was justified, with the rationale that it upheld the general principle of utility. 17 
What distinguished liberalism from liberal democracy was that while liberalism denied 
women the vote, liberal democracy secured this right for women. While liberalism granted 
the new freedoms to the men of the new middle classes and the bourgeoisie, liberal 
democracy wished to grant universal franchise to all mature adults. 18 















95) relentlessly opposed the theory of liberalism which made the relation of the individual 
vis a vis the state the starting-point of their analysis of the state. As Marx put it, 'man is not 
an abstract being squatting outside the world. Man is the human world, the state, society.' 
It is not isolated human beings who are active in historical and political processes, but rather 
human beings who live in definite relations with others. In other words, the relationships 
between people in society have to be analyzed on the basis of class divisions. Class divisions 
are not found in all societies, and are a creation of history, and will disappear in the future. 
The earliest types of 'tribal' society were classless. This is because in such types of society, 
there was no surplus production and no private property. The fruits of production were 
distributed through the community as a whole. Class divisions arose when a surplus was 
generated, which created a situation where non-producers lived off the productive activity 
of others. Those who are able to gain control of the means of production form a dominant 
or ruling class both economically and politically. For Marx and Engels, class relations are 
necessarily exploitative and imply divisions of interest between ruling and subordinate 
classes. These class divisions are inherently conflictual and frequently give rise to active class 
struggles which form the 'motor' of historical development. 19 
How then should the nature of the state be understood? According to Marx and 
Engels, liberalism and liberal democracy claims to represent the community or public 
interest, in contrast to individuals' private aims and concerns. But, the opposition between 
interests that are public and general, and those that are private and particular, is to a large 
extent illusory. 
The state defends the 'public' or the 'community' as if: classes did not exist; 
the relations between classes were not exploitative; classes did not have 
fundamental differences of interest; these differences of interest did not define 
economic and political life. In treating everyone in the same way, according 
to principles which protect the freedom of individuals and defend their right 












partial - sustaining the privileges of those with property. 20 
Marxism considers the distinction between private and public, and state and civil society as 
dubious. Private property is treated as if it is not a subject for politics, and the state ought 
not to interfere in the economy. But by defending private property, Marxists argue, the state 
has already taken sides. The state, therefore, is not an independent structure above society, 
a 'public power' acting for 'the public', but deeply embedded in socio-economic relations and 
linked to particular interests. 21 
The fourth position is that of 'political sociology' or political pluralism which was 
advocated by Max Weber as a critical response to the Marxist notion of the state being a 
'parasitic' organ that was a direct product of class activity. Weber also resisted the idea that 
institutions of the modem state should be 'smashed' in a revolutionary process of 
transformation. He considered this to be a foolhardy strategy. 22 
In his definition of the state, Weber emphasized two distinctive elements in the history 
of states: territoriality and violence. This means that the modem state, unlike its predecessors 
which were constantly troubled by warring factions, has a capability of monopolizing 
violence within a given territory. The modem state is a nation-state that is involved in 
embattled relations with other nation-states rather than with armed groups within its own 
population. 23 
A third key term in Weber's definition of the state is legitimacy, which means that 
"the state is based on a monopoly of physical coercion which is legitimized (that is, 
sustained) by a· belief in the justifiability and/or legality of this monopoly." Weber argued 
that nowadays people do not obey authority on the basis of habit, tradition or the charisma 
and personal appeal of individual leaders. Rather, obedience is based on a belief in the 












the authority of the modem state is founded on its commitment to a 'code of legal 
regulations'. 24 
The essence of the pluralist position is that 'there are many determinants of the 
distribution of power other than class and therefore, many power centres.' This idea is now 
taken much further than Weber. According to modem pluralists: 
power is non-hierarchically and competitively arranged. It is an inextricable 
part of an 'endless process of bargaining' between numerous groups 
representing different interests, for example, business organizations, trade 
unions, parties, ethnic groups, students, prisons officers, women's institutes, 
religious groups ... 25 
Therefore, according to democratic pluralism, all the different 'interest groups' mobilize and 
compete for equal access to scarce resources. What government does is mediate and 
adjudicate between competing demands. The rules of democratic procedure have to ensure 
that the competition between the various social groups is fair, which would result in creating 
government by multiple groups or multiple minorities which, in tum, secures the democratic 
character of the regime. Dahl calls this 'polyarchy', which means 'minorities government'. 
This position can be highly criticized on the grounds that: 
the existence of disparate power centres hardly guarantees that government 
will (1) listen to them all equally; (2) do anything other than to communicate 
with the leaders of such groups; (3) be susceptible to influence by anybody 
other than those in powerful positions; (4) do anything about the issues under 
discussion, and so on. 26 
In addition to these criticisms, Marxists also contend that many groups do not have the 
resources to compete in the national political arena. They do not have the same clout as, say, 
multinational corporations. Neo-pluralists increasingly accept th~t. there are such constraints 
placed on Western governments and state institutions by the requirements of private 
accumulation. 27 












Western world in recent times. It has also highlighted the Gesellschaft characteristics of 
modem political theory. The crucial issues that face Islamist/Muslim political theorists of the 
modem age is: how would they theoretically respond to the problems of disparate interest 
groups within a Muslim nation-state? How could some form of balance be generated between 
the state and civil society? And, moreover, how could public life be effectively regulated in 
the complex social arena Muslim societies find themselves in? 
The following section of this chapter examines certain trends that developed in the 
Muslim world during the early part of the twentieth century. We look at the emergence of 
secular political ideologies in Pakistan and Egypt. To do this, I have chosen two prominent 
political figures from the Muslim world, Muhammad Ali Jinnah of Pakistan, and Gamal 
Abdel Nasser of Egypt. These two personalities were most responsible for leading their two 
respective nations into the modem post-colonial era. We briefly look at how they approached 
the issues facing the newly emerging Muslim 'nations', as well as other currents of thought 
(Islamist) that contested the positions adopted by them. A detailed discussion of the Islamist 
vision follows in chapter three. 
2.4 The Emergence of Secular Politics in the Muslim World 
Jinnah and the Creation of a Secular Pakistan 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, there arose in India a political leader who was 
considered as an 'ambassador for Hindu-Muslim unity'. Muhammad Ali Jinnah led the All-
India Muslim League, and became associated with the demand for the independent Muslim 
state of Pakistan. In principle, he was a nationalist, and opposed to creating a state on the 
basis of religious ideology. He opposed Mahatma Gandhi for his support of the Khilafat 
















activists. 28 Jinnah was a centrist and not keen on the idea of separate Muslim provinces. 
Instead, he wanted to secure power for Muslims at a strong centre, where he demanded that 
up to one third of the seats of the central legislature should be reserved for them. After being 
overwhelmed by those who advocated separate provinces for Muslims, he made a tactical 
concession by appearing to favour a weak federal structure. 29 
Initially, Jinnah's vision was closer to that of the Hindu-led Congress which was 
committed to a strong unitary centre. He had to reconcile this with the conflicting demands 
of the Muslim provinces, whom he tried to persuade that real security for· the Muslims, 
especially in the minority provinces, lay not in separate electorates, but in an agreement with 
the Congress at the centre. 30 Jinnah was faced with the dilemma of his own political vision 
of a non-ideological state on the one hand, and the expectations and aspirations of his 
constituency, the Muslim masses, who favoured a separate state, on the other hand. 
Secondly, he had to deal with the contradiction between securing Muslim interests in the 
majority provinces as well as the minority provinces. If those provinces who had Muslim 
majority populations separated from a greater India, who would champion the course of those 
Muslims who would be left behind in those provinces where they constituted a minority? The 
demand for autonomous Muslim states conflicted with the need for a centre capable of 
ensuring the interests of Muslims in the rest of India. 31 Eventually, Jinnah acquiesced to the 
idea of a separate Pakistan, since the Muslim electorate chose so. 32 
Jinnah later also saw that the cultural and social differences between Hindus and 
Muslims were too deep-rooted. They had two opposite worldviews. Besides, the Hindus had 
gained the upper hand during British rule in both economic and political matters, so it 
became clear that Muslim interests would be vulnerable in a united India. Consequently, 















Muslim identity in a Hindu-dominated united India. However, Jinnah did not have any plans 
to establish a theocratic state. In fact, he steadfastly supported the idea of a secular state. In 
this he was opposed by most of the 'ulama who were not keen on the idea of a national 
secular state. 33 
Jinnah was concerned that 'religion should not enter politics'. He wished to deal with 
the problem of minorities through a political approach. By minorities, he understood not only 
those minorities that were separate from the mainstream on the basis of religion, but who 
were different on the basis of language, culture, race, art, music and so forth. He felt that 
"the solutions to these communal problems were cast in political, not religious terms. "34 
Jinnah, in his address to the members of the Pakistan Constituent Assembly, appealed to 
them to concentrate on the well-being of the people, especially the poor, no matter what 
community they belonged to, and 'no matter what was their colour, cast or creed'. He 
believed that the religious affiliation of the people had nothing to do with the affairs of the 
State. Everyone had to be an equal citizen of one state. He appealed to Hindus and Muslims 
to cease to be Hindus and Muslims in the political sense, but maintain their religious identity 
and personal faith in the religious sense. 35 
Jinnah distanced himself from calls made by influential people such as Iqbal, that 
Pakistan's social and economic programme should be based on the 'Law of Islam'. He feared 
that the task of interpreting the 'Law' would go to the 'ulama who were the traditional 
guardians of the law. 36 Jinnah even went, to the extent of insisting that a draft resolution 
basing the future constitution of Pakistan on Islamic principles be withdrawn, and replaced 
with the clause that 'The Constitution of the Government [of Pakistan] will be what the 













Nasser and the Unfolding of Modern Politics in Egypt 
In the liberation of Egypt from the clutches of European colonial domination, several 
movements emerged. These movements embraced different ideologies. They ranged from 
secularly orientated parties such as the Wafd (delegation), Misr al-Fatat (Young Egypt), and 
communist parties, to the Ikhwan al-Muslimin (The Muslim Brotherhood) who championed 
the idea of establishing an Islamic state. 
Among these various movements, the Free Officers movement, was founded by the 
sons of junior military officials and middle peasant families. They were the first officers to 
be drawn from more modest origins. Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat were affiliated 
to them. Later, Nasser was destined to make the greatest impact on modem Egyptian politics. 
Nasser was born in January 1918 in Alexandria. He grew up witnessing the political turmoil 
around him, and the poverty of the peasants along the Nile. These conditions made an 
imprint on his mind and shaped his political ambitions, beginning dramatically with the coup 
of 1952 which deposed King Farouk. 38 
British domination disrupted the Egyptian economy, and caused resentment amongst 
the people. In their quest for self-determination, some senior Egyptians requested that a wafd 
(delegation), led by Sa'ad Zaghlul, represent Egypt at the peace conference in Paris in 1918. 
This request was not granted. After much public agitation, limited 'independence' was 
granted in 1922. Egypt had its King Fuad, who was an autocratic character, as well as a 
nominal parliament dominated by the Wafd party. Zaghlul who led the Wafd until 1927, was 
opposed to Fuad. 39 After Zaghlul's death, during the 1930's, the once popular Wafd party 
largely represented the interests of the landed classes. As a result, the gap between the 
politicians and the people widened, with political repression adding to the burden of low 














organisations appeared and created an appeal among the masses. Among these organizations 
was the Ikhwan, which appealed to a return to Islamic values. Their ideas spread rapidly 
among the displaced urban masses. The Ikhwan was a political as well as a social movement 
which established a network of social organizations to help with the hardships of life. Later, 
they became identified as a fanatical fundamentalist movement. 40 The Ikhwan wanted to 
fight both 'external' as well as 'internal' imperialism. By 'internal' imperialism, they meant 
those local people who were indifferent to the Muslim community's needs, and served the 
needs of the 'external' imperialists instead. These 'internal' imperialists were also held 
responsible for spreading moral corruption, and diverting people from their traditional 
faith. 41 
Another smaller organization, Young Egypt, followed the model of the young fascist 
movements of Europe. Nasser joined them in 1934. Nasser himself did not have a particular 
ideology in the strict sense of the word. His political vision lacked clarity, and he vacillated 
between radical nationalism and socialism. Nevertheless, his advocacy of Arab nationalism 
was his hallmark, since it greatly appealed not only to the Egyptian masses, but later won 
him adoration across the Arab world. 42 
Nasser, unlike Ataturk, was not particularly wedded to the idea of a secular state. He 
and the Free Officers had no plan to eliminate Islam from Egyptian life. In fact, they made 
their adherence to Islam clear by preaching in the Friday sermons, and legitimating their 
policies and directions. Prayer, fasts, and pilgrimage were consistent images which the Free 
··Officers projected of themselves. Although they opposed the Ikhwan politically, they wanted 
to make it clear to them that they were no lesser Muslims. 43 
Later, in 1962 Nasser came to believe that socialism was the only solution for Egypt 












capitalism was responsible for exploiting the country, and was associated with imperialism. 
However, he made it clear that his type of socialism was to be different from Marxist 
communism. The introduction of a thoroughgoing godless communist system was unamicable 
to Egypt, and therefore had to be adapted. 44 
Ideologically, Nasser could be described as pragmatic, since he picked his way 
through different currents of thought. He embraced in part the Islamic reformism of Abduh, 
and also selected opinions from fascists, communists, radical socialists, and Islamic 
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The Islamist Utopia 
Since Islamists such as Mawdudi and Qutb have been dubbed "fundamentalist" by scholars, 
political analysts, as well as journalists, this chapter first tries to define the phenomenon of 
fandamentalism as a problem in religious and political discourse. Some writers have referred 
to the fundamentalist phenomenon as Islamic 'resurgence'. Later, an appraisal of Mawdudi 
and Qutb's political philosophy will depict the 'fundamentalist' traits that are manifest in their 
worldview. 
3.1 Defining Fundamentalism 
As it would be with any other religious tradition, defining and categorizing the different 
trends one finds amongst Muslim societies is highly problematic. Within the discipline of 
sociology of religion, scholars no mally categorize religious divisions into 'orthodox', 
'heterodox', 'fundamentalist', or 'progressive'. However, the term fundamentalism has 
attracted a lot of controversy and fierce reaction from Muslims. It seems to have assumed 
a supreme derogatory status in modem times. As applied by the Western media, sometimes, 
Muslims who are fighting for self-determination from alien rule, such as the Palestinians 
against the Israelis, are branded as fundamentalists and terrorists, whereas they see 
themselves as freedom fighters in a legitimate cause. If they resort to violence to achieve 
their aims, then it is as a result of other avenues being closed to them. Those advocating a 
















Examples of these are the Hamas in Palestine, the Jama'at of Egypt, and the Islamic 
Salvation Front (FIS) of Algeria. 
Some scholars have suggested alternative terms to escape fundamentalism's negative 
connotations. The term 'literalists' has been proposed by some, in order to point to the 
fundamentalist tendency of turning to divine texts and interpreting them "literally." Aqeel 
Bilgrami has preferred the term 'absolutist', to point to the tendency to absolutize particular 
positions and particular interpretations. Yet others have referred to them as 'technists' (Eric 
Winkel) for the reason that they adopt a technical approach and attitude towards the issues 
that they emphasize. I prefer to use the term fundamentalist since it is the most widely used 
one. It should be noted that in academic circles, Fundamentalism is employed as a generic 
term that is applied not only to Muslims specifically, but to all religious trends that display 
some common "family traits." 
Martin E. Marty and R. Scott Appleby suggest the following definition: 
Religious fundamentalism has appeared in the twentieth century as a tendency, 
a habit of mind, found within religious communities and paradigmatically 
embodied in certain representatives individual movements, which manifests 
itself as a strategy, or set of strategies, by which beleaguered believers attempt 
to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group. Feeling this identity 
to be at risk in the contemporary era, they fortify it by a selective retrieval of 
doctrines, beliefs, and practices from a sacred past. These retrieved 
"fundamentals" are refined, modified, and sanctioned in a spirit of shrewd 
pragmatism: they are to serve as a bulwark against the encroachment of 
outsiders who threaten to draw the believers into a syncretistic, areligious, or 
irreligious cultural milieu. 1 
The problem that lslamist organizations have with the concept of fundamentalism is that "it 
is an ethnocentric, militantly secularist sociological categorization based on specious cross-
cultural analogies. "2 While the notion of fundamentalism first gained currency in discussions 
of nineteenth-century American religious movements, it was Talcott Parsons's study of the 












which has come to colour use of the term, particularly when it was extended to the sociology 
of religion. For Parsons, the fundamentalist reaction was a pathological, authoritarian 
reconstruction of an idealized social status quo in response to increasingly high levels of 
dysfunction in the existing social status quo. 3 
Fundamentalism rejects the 'modem' method of political organization. 
Fundamentalists believe religion to be inseparable from law and politics or governance, and 
therefore reject the private/public dichotomy. This public/private distinction stands as a 
hallmark of modem democratic systems, since the populations of polities are no more 
homogeneous. There are certain matters that pertain to specific religious groups, such as 
those affairs that matter only to individuals, families, and churches, and matters of devotion 
and worship. Then there are other more general issues that are common to all the disparate 
groups that live under the ambit of the polity, such as defence, commerce, education, health 
policy, transportation, etc. This is precisely what fundamentalists reject. They feel strongly 
that there is no such thing as a private matter. Everything and every area of the lives of 
humans is prescribed by God's will. For them, the very notion that religion is a private affair 
smacks of blasphemy. 4 
Consequently, real freedom is rejected by fundamentalists. They are of the view that 
everyone residing within the confines of the polity should submit to the superiority and 
ascendancy of their particular faith. 5 
Fundamentalists are called thus because they select certain fundamentals from 
religion. These "fundamentals" are considered to constitute the core of the faith. The 
"fundamentals" that are retrieved by them usually do not "fit" in with modem society. For 
instance, just when "modem" Muslims attempt to present Islam as a faith that is compatible 

















fundamentalists come along calling for the stoning of adulterers, the execution of those whom 
they consider to be apostates, and the imprisoning of dissenters. All this is advocated in the 
name of Islam. Likewise, just when the Zionists establish the State of Israel on secular 
principles,· radical religious Jews raise a storm that the Zionist state is ultimately religious, 
and in truth, it is the land that was promised to Abraham by God in the Torah. 6 
Fundamentalists deplore the secularization of lands or movements that they believe 
are sacred at the very core. In their reaction, they stress beliefs or practices they feel are 
ignored, eclipsed or de-emphasized. The doctrines and rituals de-emphasized are often the 
ones that would embarrass people who wish that their religious life ought to be compatible 
with their modern way of life. But for fundamentalists, those very points which are 
extraordinary and apparently "irrational", are what religion and existence are all about. 
Fundamentalists do not wish to subject themselves to enlightenment "rationality." Religion 
after all has to remain mysterious and unexplainable by humans. 7 
Fundamentalists detest and reject the modern liberal approach that there are different 
ways of believing and acting, and therefore admit the possibility of many different, equally 
valid expressions of religious faith and identity. This is regarded as a recipe for confusion 
and disorientation. Once allowance is made for different formulations and different 
interpretations, you open up a slippery rode to relativism--the notion that no belief has the 
right to claim absolute truth, and pluralism--the notion that the existence of many different 
expressions of belief is in itself a good thing. 8 
Fundamentalists also have a deep-rooted desire to gain political ~S.cendency. They 
possess a will to rule the land they inhabit according to the fundamentals they have set out. 9 
For them, it is the only way they could design a polity based on their world view, which 












Ironically, while fundamentalism condemns modernity at every tum, it is very much 
a modem phen<?menon. What also makes it so modem is the fact that it imitates and employs 
all the conveniences that modernity has to off er, such as modem telecommunications systems 
and the like. American Protestant televangelists as well as fundamentalist Muslims in the 
Middle East have used modern media to their advantage. As Marty and Appleby put it: "Let 
Westerners subvert Islamic villages with the secular sounds of cassettes and transistor radios--
the Ayatollahs will fight back with revolutionary cassettes of their own. "10 
Besides the material technology of modernity that the fundamentalists appropriate, 
they also manipulate the use of modern forms of arguments. "Fundamentalists often fight 
modernity by seizing the concept of reason and 'throwing it back,' using not unreason but 
a different modality of rationalism. "11 In the Islamic case, this could be born out by the way 
fundamentalist organizations manipulate the word shura (consultation), and try to present it 
as equivalent to democracy. 
3.2 Islamic Political Resurgence as Fundamentalism 
Islam is no stranger to the competing claims between those who battle to secure religious 
interests, and those who enjoy political power. The post-colonial period of Islamic history 
has seen a tremendous conflict of discourses between what has now become different sub-
systems. While on the one hand, politicians or economists who are trained in 'secular' 
institutions, may envisage a particular areligious manner of approaching matters of concern 
to them, religious scholars, .. ~s well as many of their lay followers condemn this and 
propagate instead, religious teachings and laws which they invoke from a past tradition. 
The crucial question that arises is: what are the motivations for such an appeal to 












well as 'educated' and 'enlightened' people to invoke a past religious tradition, and absolutize 
its status, as a blueprint for the way forward, for contemporary society? 
Some analysts have attributed this resurgence of religious fervour to purely religious 
factors, or factors pertaining to a rise in the religious mood. Other observers have attributed 
it to the fact that communities feel that the very foundations of their moral fibre are being 
threatened by the modem age and its mode of life. In other words, their spirituality and their 
value-system are threatened. Yet others such as Shireen Hunter12 present the hypothesis that 
what actually causes Islamic resurgence is discontent with the modem world. According to 
this view, it is social, economic and political discontentment rather than religious reasons that 
give rise to the 'fundamentalist' phenomenon. The majority of Muslim populations have been 
left deprived, disgruntled and betrayed by modernity, which motivates them to resuscitate a 
bygone order. 
Such discontent stems from many different social groups. Bazaar merchants resent 
socialist controls as well as unbridled capitalist development that threatens to pass them by. 
Ordinary people, as well as labour unions resent the repression of an authoritarian state. 
Rural people find no comfort and opportunity in the cities, after the disruption of their 
farming networks and support systems. Modem education produces more dropouts due to 
lack of opportunity in the markets. Graduates of religious schools lose career opportunities 
to graduates from secular institutions. Males resent female emancipation, and international 
politics only adds to the frustrating woes of the Muslim populations. 13 
In my view, attempting to explain the motivations for religious resurgence solely on 
the basis of socio-economic and political factors, would be reductionist. It is my contention 
that religious resurgence in the form of a call for the establishment of an Islamic state can 












factors, and at times it could be aroused by purely religious or cultural considerations. In 
other words, when a society feels that the very foundations of its morality, and its ethical 
values are facing serious challenges from an alien value-system, it resists the encroaching 
system. Some people invoke religion in their renunciation of the invading order, while others 
may solicit their cultural traditions, or the practices of their forefathers, in articulating their 
abhorrence to the invading culture. It is possible that people who may be socially, 
economically and politically privileged, may at times rebuke foreign influences, purely on 
the basis of religious or cultural considerations. Therefore, it cannot be said that the rejection 
of modernity is entirely out of socio-economic and political impoverishment. At times there 
could be a preponderance of one factor over others. However, one could concur with those 
analysts who posit the view that in modem times, the predominant stimulus to Islamic 
resurgence, and the call for the restoration of Islamic government in the form of the 
caliphate, could be the socio-economic and political damage that has been wrought by the 
advent of modernity in Muslim lands. 
Why then do the 'fundamentalists' or those seeking a resurgence of the glorious past 
invoke religious fundamentals in order to overcome their predicament? For them, religion 
serves as the highest source for values such as justice, equality and fairness. The injustice 
in their past situations are evaluated against these criteria, presented as the legitimate 
aspirations of the subject peoples. 
It is for this reason that, to their credit, some fundamentalists movements, such as the 
Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, do not just confine themselves to waging a negative diatribe 
against the ruling elites. In order to 'rectify' the socio-economic imbalances, they engage in 
community-building projects which serve useful functions in society, at a time when modem 












fact that one may raise the criticism that these communities are based on strong religious 
authoritarianism. 14 Fundamentalists have overtaken their liberal counterparts in effectively 
building communities which have succeeded to some extent in cushioning the harsh 
carelessness that modern society displays towards impoverished peoples. For example, in 
Egypt, they have set up Islamic banks that operate on interest-free, Islamic principles. By so 
doing, they have made possible access to capital to those people who would normally be 
disqualified by banking institutions that operate on "Western" principles of usury, and are 
connected to the world banking system controlled by the Western powers. They also provide 
job opportunities to fellow "fundamentalists." Besides banks, they are also responsible for 
setting up other much needed community organizations such as schools, clinics, orphanages 
and mosques. 15 They have filled a void where the state has failed in its responsibilities. The 
fundamentalists have formed a kind of civil society of their own. 
The lslamist/fundamentalist worldview that has been briefly described in the 
aforegoing part of this chapter has its ideological source in the writings of Abu al A 'la 
Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb. The following part of this chapter therefore analyzes the political 
theories of these two ideologues. It must be noted that their political theories provide us with 
significant insights into their overall social theories. 
3.3 Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb's Conceptions of Islamic Political Theory 
Abu al-A 'la Mawdudi was a prolific journalist and editor of several Muslim newspapers in 
the city of Lahore. He was also a diligent writer and speaker advocating the cause of Islam 
and Pan-lslamism. Mawdudi, a staunch advocate of Pan-lslamism, attacked patriotism based 
on race, territory, language, and culture. In its place, he promoted the idea of an Islamic 














the basis of their Islamic allegiance. This bond should lead to a world Islamic union 
superseding all other ties. He strongly felt that only if Islam formed the basis of Muslim 
global solidarity, would the Muslims be in a position to solve the immense socio-economic 
and political problems that they faced, and be able to counter the hegemony of Western 
civilization. 16 
I 
Nationalism: Islam's Antithesis? 
Mawdudi considered the only legitimate bond that was worthy of binding all the Muslims of 
• the world to be Islam. For Mawdudi, nationalism was the total antithesis of Islam, whose 
very spirit and goals were distinct from those of Islam. Islam presented to all mankind one 
collective system of doctrine, morality, piety and justice. Whoever accepted this system, was 
equally obliged by its rights and duties, whether they pertained to matters of devotion, social 
life, politics, economics or law, without any scope for geographical or ethnic distinctions. 17 
The ultimate objective, he said, was to attain a "world state" in which all humans will 
enjoy equal rights and be equally stratified into one single civilization and one single political 
system, which will replace "adversarial competition" with "friendly cooperation", so that 
people would assist one another towards material and spiritual prosperity. This system will 
only appeal to the multitudes of mankind when they have freed themselves from the 
prejudices of jahiliyyah (the age of ignorance) and ethnic arrogance, and begin relating to 
people solely on the basis of their humanity. 18 
On the other hand, Mawdudi elaborated, nationalism distinguished-between humans 
on spurious grounds. The minimum requirement of nationalism was that one discriminates 
between one's own nation and "others" in socio-cultural and political matters. One was 












for other nations. The historical narratives that engendered national prejudice were jealously 
preserved. This competition for resources between nations blinded them on issues of justice 
and fairness, since their ultimate goal was confined to the supremacy of the "national state." 
And if the particular nation-state in question had any extra-territorial intentions, then such 
intentions were motivated solely for the imperialistic purpose of enslaving other nations for 
their own selfish objectives. 19 Mawdudi concluded that the two systems of Islam and 
nationalism were diametrically opposed to one another. Wherever nationalism existed, there 
was no room for Islam, and vice versa. 20 
Mawdudi traced the roots of European nationalism to ancient Greece. He quotes 
Aristotle in his book Politics as saying that "nature has created the Barbarians only to serve 
as slaves ... By Barbarians, he meant, all non-Greeks. "21 Subsequent to that, says Mawdudi, 
Christianity, as corrupted as it may have become, thwarted the spread of nationalism for a 
time by maintaining a broad view of humanity. For centuries, the effect of the Roman 
Empire, coupled with the teachings of Christianity, was that it united disparate groups and 
subjected them to a single authority. The spiritual realm of the Pope, and the temporal world 
of the king remained in unison. However, this cooperative arrangement between these two 
spheres was confined to their opposition to intellectual progress. With regard to the 
distribution of worldly power and worldly benefits, they were fierce contenders. 22 
While the sixteenth century Reformation had the benefit of deposing the Pope and the 
Emperor, it had the adverse effect of splitting up the diverse nations that were hitherto held 
together. The Reformation was unable to provide the spiritual bond that the Church 011c~ 
provided. Eventually, every nation went about enhancing its literature, its politics and its 
socio-economic system. In this way, it created a new-found national pride, and rekindled old 












In analyzing the genesis of nationalistic fervour, Mawdudi opined that even though 
it may be inspired by a need to eliminate injustices that were perpetrated on one's own nation 
by some other nation, if nationalism were not constrained by a divine code of spiritual 
teachings and moral guidance it would result in imperialism and in what he calls "economic 
nationalism." Eventually it heralds in the principle of: "the survival of the fittest nations. "24 
Sayyid Qutb, influenced by Mawdudi, also condemned nationalism, secularism, 
socialism, communism, democracy and capitalism. In his book Milestones, he vehemently 
employs the use of the term jahiliyya (the state of ignorance prior to the rise of Islam in 
Arabia), as a motif with which to attack these alien systems. 
Allah the Sole Sovereign 
Fundamentally, for Mawdudi and for Sayyid Qutb, the Islamic social and moral system is 
based on the unity and the sole sovereignty of Allah. Mawdudi states: 
It is the very starting-point of the Islamic political philosophy. The basic 
principle of Islam is that human beings must individually and collectively 
surrender all rights of lordship, legislation and exercising of authority over 
others. No one should be allowed to pass orders or make commands on his 
own right and no one ought to accept the obligation to carry out such 
commands and obey such orders. None is entitled to make laws on his own 
authority and none is obliged to abide by them. 25 
Mawdudi quotes verses from the Qur'an which read as: 
Authority rests with none but Allah. He commands you not to surrender to 
any one save Him. This is the right way (of life). (ch.XII v.40) 
They ask: 'have we also got some authority?' Say: 'all authority belongs to 
God alone'. (ch.III v .154) 
Who so does not establish and decide by that which Allah revealed, such are 
disbelievers. (ch.V v.44)26 
He then elaborates, that according to this theory, sovereignty belongs to Allah, who alone 












right (unless working on God's orders), to do or not to do certain things. The Prophet 
himself is subject to God's commands.27 He concludes that: 
~, 
1) No person, class or group, not even the entire population of the state as a 
whole, can lay claim to sovereignty. God alone is the sovereign; all others are 
merely his subjects; 
2) God is the real law-giver and the authority of absolute legislation vests in 
Him. The believers cannot resort to totally independent legislation nor can 
they modify any law which God has laid down, even if the desire to effect 
such legislation or change in Divine laws is unanimous. 28 
Sayyid Qutb also emphasized the sole sovereignty of Allah in order to contest the claim to 
sovereignty as well as the legitimacy of the nation-state and its institutions. He is quoted to 
have said: 
The universe is regulated by one single law which binds all its parts in a 
harmonious and orderly sequence. This systematic and congruent arrangement 
is the creation of one will, or the expression of one God. The multiplicity of 
beings, or essences, leads to a multiplicity of wills, and gives rise to diverse 
rules and judgements. The will is the manifest expression of an active essence, 
and law is the aspect of the effective will. For were it not so, the unity which 
co-ordinates the whole cosmic order, and regularizes its course, direction, and 
conduct, would disappear, and disorder would follow the disruption of 
harmony29 
According to Qutb, God has imprinted his signs throughout the universe in order to announce 
his oneness, authority and lordship. Man's responsibility in performing the act of submission 
is not the mere belief in God's existence; rather, it is the admission of his exclusive authority 
in determining the moral, political and economic aspects of all societies. "The function of 
the human being is to receive, respond to, adapt and apply the immutable characteristics of 
divine rules. "30 
Mawdudi contends that thousands of years of experiericeJias confirmed that humanity 
-cannot help but set up someone or other as a 'god' 'ilah' and 'rabb', as someone to look 
towards for guidance and help. And, if mankind does not believe in the one supreme God, 












gods, who enslave and control other humans, assume the position of 'ilah', God. They come 
in the shape of political party leaders, money-magnates, dictators, and arbiters of man's 
destiny, who subject other humans to their will. 31 
The consequences of this domination of man by man, Mawdudi elaborates, is that 
these men attempt to play the role of divinity. Hence, we find for example, a mean and 
incompetent person being appointed as a police commissioner, or an "ignorant and narrow-
minded politician being exalted to the rank of a prime minister. "32 The effect of godhood 
is so intoxicating that whoever has a taste of it can never keep himself under control. When 
man's overlordship over man was established, tyranny, despotism, unlawful exploitation, and 
inequality reigned supreme. In fact the qualities required for fulfilling the task of godhood 
will always remain out of the reach of humans. 33 
The conclusion . that Qutb and Mawdudi derive from asserting the exclusive 
sovereignty (hdamiyya) of God is to negate the concept of the legal and political sovereignty . 
of human beings, individually or collectively. For them, God alone is the Sovereign ~nd his 
Commandments are the Law of Islam'34 At another instance, Qutb has said that: "When in 
a society, sovereignty belongs to God alone, then only is every person in that society free 
from the servitude of others .... On the other hand, in a society in which some people are 
lords who legislate and some others are slaves who obey them, then there is no freedom in 
the real sense, nor dignity for each and every individual. "35 
Qutb employed the central ideas of Mawdudi, and served as a transmitter of his ideas, 
but what distinguished Mawdudi from him is that he was more emotional in his rhetoric. 
Qutb employed a "repetitious and wordy style." Mawdudi on the other hand was more 
legalistic in his approach. He used deductive reasoning, and had a "tighter logic and leaner 












sovereign: something like the relationship between a master and a slave. Qutb's idea of 
divine sovereignty precluded all human sovereignty. For him, any non-divine sovereignty is 
taghllt (a false god, illegitimate).37 
• 
However, the concept of Allah's sovereignty as mentioned in several Qur'anic verses, 
has been misinterpreted by Mawdudi and Qutb. What those verses refer to is that Allah 
exercises his general power over the entire creation as Creator, Sustainer, Guide, and Judge, 
and has nothing to do with the specific concept of political sovereignty. Political sovereignty 
in the 'modem' sense is the possession of the necessary coercive power to ensure obedience 
to the laws of the polity. Since Allah does not exercise political power directly by himself, 
he cannot be regarded as sovereign in this political sense. This is precisely why humans 
-
require a khalifa (vicegerent) who practically exercises that power. Therefore, Mawdudi's 
designation of Allah as the sovereign is a misunderstanding, because Allah does not drrectly 
exercise effective political power. 38 Alternatively, if it is said that the shari 'a is the 
sovereign, then that is also mistaken, as the shari'a as a law is an impersonal thing and 
cannot by itself be said to exercise political power. Instead, the shari 'a is something that has 
to be implemented and enforced by a sovereign power. 39 
However one may understand God's sovereignty, ultimately power has to be exercised 
by some mortal being. In order to deal with that problem, the Islamic tradition conceived of 
the concept of khilafa (vicegerency). The office of khilafa or the caliph, as discussed in 
chapter one, is understood to be God's representative on earth. His function is merely to 
implement the 'will of Allah' in the land. 
-Mawdudi has invoked the concept of khilafa from traditional political philosophy. He 
-
states that Islam uses the term 'vicegerency' (khilafa) instead of sovereignty, since 












Ruler, God, and will not be authorized to exercise any powers other than those delegated to 
him. And who is the caliph of God? The whole community of believers are worthy of what 
Mawdudi calls 'popular vicegerency', which makes everyone a caliph of God.40 The 
purpose behind popular vicegerency is to render all members of the community equal, 
without any distinction based on birth, profession, or social position. 11 So no Arab can claim 
superiority over a non-Arab, nor can a white man claim superiority over a black man. 11 The 
ultimate purpose of popular sovereignty is to leave no room for dictatorship by any person 
or group, since everyone is God's caliph. No person is entitled to become an absolute 
ruler.41 
Mawdudi and Sayyid Qutb were very much opposed to the concept of democracy. 
However, it must be understood that the democracy they opposed was that form of 
democracy that was practised in the Western countries, a democracy that could be described 
as laissez faire democracy. At the same time, Mawdudi and Qutb abhorred arbitrary 
dictatorship as practised in Muslim countries. In its place, they advocated such a political 
system that would be more reflective of the popular will of the masses to a limited extent. 
It is this 11Islamized form of democracy 11 that Mawdudi described as a theo-democracy. He 
explained his notion of a theo-democracy as a system in which -- unlike the bitter experience 
of medieval theocracy in Europe under the priests -- the entire Muslim population would run 
the state in accordance with the Book of God and the practice of His Prophet. This would 
be a divine form of democratic government in which the Muslims were given a limited 
amount of popular sovereignty under the suzerainty of God. The executive under this system 
of government is constituted by the general will of the Muslims who also have the right to 
depose it. All administrative matters and all questions about which no explicit injunctions are 












and qualified to give a sound opinion on matters of Islamic law, is entitled to interpret god's 
law when such interpretation becomes necessary. But, where an explicit command exists, no 
Muslim leader or legislator, not even all the Muslims of the world put together, have any 
right to make the least alteration. 42 
Qutb also believed the Islamic system to be of a 'democratic' nature. Accordingly, 
authority in Islam was exercised on the basis of consultation. The methods and procedures 
of consultation were purely technical, and might vary and diverge in order to gauge the 
opinion of the entire nation. The principle of electing a Muslim ruler according to the will 
of the people was firmly established by an explicit text of the Qur'an. In the early days of 
Islam, shura (consultation) was confined to the city of Medina. After the death of the Prophet 
the first Caliph, Abu Bakr, extended this procedure to encompass both Medina and Mecca. 
Nowadays, it is necessary to get the opinion of the masses as a whole. All that remains is 
to work out the technical details of how to implement shura (consultation). This freedom of 
choice, for Qutb, was limited to electing a ruler already committed to the application of the 
shari'a. With the exception of theoretical and applied sciences, such as technical skills, the 
art of war and the cultivation of land, Islamic law must be paramount, binding both the ruler 
a_nd the ruled. So, obedience to an Islamic ruler was only dependent on his implementation 
of the shari'a. If he violated the shari'a then he was not deserving of obedience.43 
Qutb judged purely 'scientific subjects' to fall beyond the legal sphere of Islam, while 
social matters, acts of devotion, and 'all that pertains to man's soul and mind' were under 
the jurisdiction of the shari'a. Thus, punishments ordained by the Qur'an, such as amputating 
a thief's hand, stoning or flogging an adulterer, and whipping a drunkard, had to be carried 
out. He thought that mitigating circumstances such as hunger in the case of theft was proof 












and provisions of the shari 'a were clear-cut, leaving no room for ambiguity and 
complications. In fact he accused the 'ulama of complicating Islamic law by innovating a host 
of new terms and by writing commentaries upon commentaries. They are the ones who 
obscured ihe pure and simple origins of Islam. 44 
What Qutb did not seem to give a serious thought to· is that the very process of 
electing a ruler--which he acknowledges has to be specifically worked out for any given 
context--is a product of human intellectual endeavour, and is subject to various motivations 
and influences. The same is true, however, for the shar'i laws that he thinks form the 
bedrock of Muslim rule. It is a fact that shari 'a law has never been one homogeneous set of 
clear-cut rules that were never disputed, interpreted, and argued by different scholars as well 
as different power groups at different times and places in the whole of Muslim history. It was 
never as simple as just referring to some perfectly complete shar'i law code, that could be 
applied, without having to consider its socio-economic and political context, and practical 
constraints. 
To Qutb, legislators are God's agents and His trusted functionaries; their 
utterances and decisions should on no account express their free will, or 
reflect the desires of secular majorities. By devising their· own laws without 
reference to the authentic authority of the Holy Book, deputies and judges 
engage in blasphemous activities synonymous with the worship of idols or 
man-made images. In this sense, secular democracy is a deliberate violation 
of divine laws and a reversion to the days of pagan ignorance (j;hillyya). 45 
Mawdudi and Qutb are apprehensive over the role of humans in the legislative process. This 
lead them to the conclusion that God is the sole being worthy of enjoying sovereignty. 
Consequently, modem democracy ·and liberalism, which attempt to accentuate the role of 
humans over the divine, can only result in social disorder. Equality among humans, for the 
Islamists, can only be achieved if all of humanity subjects itself to a higher authority, namely 












still has to be interpreted, mediated, and applied by humans. Who is to play this role most 
effectively? Will it be the 'ulama, or will it be an "intellectual" class of people such as 
judges and lawyers, or will it be those who wield effective power, the politicians? 
With respect to modem, Western-style democracy, Mawdudi states that Islamic 
political philosophy is the very antithesis of secular Western democracy. The foundation of 
Western democracy is the sovereignty of the people. In such a system, powers of legislation 
and the determining of values and norms rest in the hands of the people. Law-making has 
to correspond to the mood and temper of their opinion. If the masses desire a particular piece 
of legislation, steps have to be taken to implement it howsoever ill-conceived it may be from 
a religious and moral standpoint. If the people dislike any law and demand that it be 
repealed, then so will be the case howsoever right and just it may be. This is not the case 
in Islam.46 
He also believed that in Western democracy, the people are sovereign, while in Islam, 
sovereignty is vested in God, and the people were his caliphs or representatives. In 
democracy, the people make their own laws, and undertake to fulfil the will of the people. 
In Islam they have to obey the laws of God and fulfil his purpose: "Western democracy is 
a kind of absolute authority which exercises its powers in a free and uncontrolled manner 
whereas the Islamic democracy is subservient to the Divine Law. "47 
While Mawdudi has expressed the necessity to curb the possibility of ·absolute power 
that a ruler could enjoy, which could result in a dictatorship to the detriment of the Muslim 
populace as a whole, he has on the other hand effectively excluded the "unqualified" Muslim 
masses from playing any role in the legislative process. Firstly, Mawdudi does not consider 
the opinions of the shura (consultative body or Muslim parliament) to be binding on the 












interpretation of the shari'a, then he may overrule their opinions. So, by disallowing decisive 
ijtihad (juristic endeavour) to the community or its effective leaders, the task of law-making 
is arrogated exclusively to one individual, the head of state, which in effect amounts to 
dictatorship. Secondly, according fo his initial theory, Mawdudi wished to exclude the masses 
from the electoral process. According to Fazlur Rahman, before Mawdudi condescended to 
accept the idea of a parliament, he believed that the shura was to be appointed by the head 
of state rather than be elected. This is a clear retrogression from the classical Sunni theory 
of the state which allowed the "people who loosen and bind 11 to elect the head of state which 
would of course preexist him, rather than be appointed by him. Thirdly, Mawdudi grants the 
head of state the power to veto decisions made by the shura. This also in effect prepares a 
recipe for dictatorship and the concentration of absolute power in one individual's hand.48 
What is the purpose of establishing an Islamic state according to Mawdudi? He states 
that the verse: "[Muslims are] those who, if we give them power in the land, establish the 
system of salat (worship) and zaka.t (poor-due) and enjoin virtue and forbid evil. 11 (Qur'an 
ch. 22:41) clearly states the aims, objects and duties of an Islamic State.49 He further states 
that: 
Unlike a Secular State, its duty is not merely to maintain internal order, to 
defend the frontiers and to work for the material prosperity of the country. 
Rather its first and foremost obligation is to establish the system of salat and 
zakat, to propagate and establish those things which have been declared to be 
'virtues' by God and His Messenger, and to eradicate those things which have 
been declared to be 'vices' by them. 50 · 
He goes on to say: 
In other words, no state can be called Islamic if it does not fulfil this 
fundamental objective of an Islamic State. Thus a state which does not take 
interest in establishing virtue and eradicating vice and in which adultery, 
drinking, gambling, obscene literature, indecent films, vulgar songs, immoral 
display of beauty, promiscuous mingling of men and women, co-education, 












Islamic Constitution must declare the above-mentioned objective as the 
primary duty of the State. 51 
Mawdudi's all-embracing philosophy emphasizes that a true Muslim polity can never break 
away from the law of their Lord. The political order, the social policy, the culture, the 
economic ideology, the legal system together with its international policy "must all be in tone 
with the Code of Guidance revealed by Allah and must, in no way, contravene it. "52 
A cautious assessment of Mawdudi and Qutb's ideological stance on the formation of 
an Islamic state would reveal the level of selectivity contained in their argument. Firstly, the 
Islamists isolate those verses of the Qur'an that mention Allah's sovereignty. These verses 
are then interpreted to connote the sole political sovereignty of Allah. In asserting this 
position, the lslamists fail to provide an account for the historical actuality of human 
sovereignty that was exercised all through the long period of Muslim political history. 
Secondly, the lslamist argument limits the scope for legislation that the elected 
political representatives would enjoy, to carry out ijti~ (original law-making) only on such 
matters that are not explicitly decreed in the holy texts. Wherever such categorical texts exist 
(mans'U.s 'alaih), the legislative assembly of the Islamic state would have no right to venture 
• c 
into any independent law-making. It would be circumscribed by the requirements of the texts. 
This is precisely contrary to the whole purpose of a legislative body which has to perform 
the task of "law-making" instead of mere "law-finding". This process of "law-making" is 
especially necessary in situations of drastic social change. 
Thirdly, the contemporary lslamist paradigm emphasizes the level of piety of the 
Muslim ruler, his benevolence, and his adherence to the shari'a. This is a concept they have 
borrowed from the juristic theories, as has been discussed in chapter (1). However, on the 
other hand, the Islamists frequently refer to the jurists' contributions to· the Islamic 












from a few exceptions such as Ibn Taymiya, is of no interest to the lslamists. In spite of 
them being Sunnis, they have no qualms about borrowing concepts and practices from the 
anti-Sunni sects: their major concept of hakimiyya (the sole sovereignty of God) seems to be 
• 
of Kharijiie inspiration. s3 lslamists advocate a return to the 'fundamental message of the 
Qur'an and the Sunnah by purging it from the debris of centuries of accretions that burden 
the Muslim heritage. •S4 In fact, political Islam is a new invention. It does. not represent any 
'going back' to any situation or theory that existed in the past. All it secures from the past 
juridic tradition is the linking of politics and religion. The difference being, that while the 
traditional jurists linked religion to politics by either providing religious legitimacy for 
political power or questioning that legitimacy in terms of religion, the Islamists seek the 
politicization of a particular vision of religion that they have in mind. To do this, they invoke 
holy texts very selectively, with remarkable innovation. ss 
Fourthly, the Islamists refuse to concede the territorial integrity of a particular people 
based on their particular cultural or ethnic affiliation. This is a position that belies the 
historical verities replete within Islamdom of separate sections of Muslim societies governing 
their own affairs independently of any central authority. For example, the Indians, for most 
of their history under Islam, remained politically independent. The same was the case with 
the Muslims of North Africa, Spain, and East Africa. 
Fifthly, the 'modem' Islamist model of state, champions very separatist policies with 
regard to non-Muslim populations, both within, and outside of the Islamic polity.· Again, 
reflection on the Islamic historical legacy would prove that the hallmark of Islam's military 
expansion and its political success, was its ability to integrate with the subject peoples of the 
conquered territories. 












adhere to, and apply the shari'a. This presupposes that their exists in Muslim society, a 
single universal understanding and interpretation of the shari'a, which in tum presupposes 
the existence of a single homogeneous community of Muslims who adopt a unified approach 
to all aspects of life. However, we have seen in chapter (1) that the dream of a single 
homogeneous ummah (community) was but a cherished hope and never a reality. Similarly, 
in the modem era of Muslim history, the lslamists harbour illusions of a homogeneous global 
ummah of Muslims who will submit to a unilinear understanding of the shari'a. This is 
precisely the approach of Gemeinschaft. 
The reality of modem Muslim societies is that they have become even more complex. 
There proliferates a multitude of diverse interest-groups with different life-experiences and 
social situations, propounding variant, and sometimes competing ideologies, worldviews, 
outlooks and orientations. Their expectations out of life differ markedly, and consequently, 
their interpretations of what constitutes the 'true shari'a' would also differ, perhaps 
substantially. 
The modem secular state, based on the principle of Gesellschaft, is designed precisely 
to cater for such divergent interests, in order to reduce tensions and conflicts between 
different groups, by granting each group the right to implement its worldview within certain 
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ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION 
In order to sum up the preceding debates, an attempt is made at appraising the questions 
raised earlier in this work. I have attempted to illustrate a broad picture of three dominant 
political trends, namely, traditional juristic political philosophy, secularized liberal 
democracy, and the contemporary Islamist vision of how the ideal polity ought to be shaped. 
Each one of these trends has its advocates in Muslim political discourse. 
Among the crucial questions in the path of Muslim politics is: How do Muslim 
societies transcend from the Gemeinschaft mentality to a situation which demands such 
solutions that are compatible with the nature of current societies. Current societies are very 
much more complex, diverse and susceptible to change. What programme of action should 
Muslims execute in order to be in step with current global developments, in order that they 
may effectively secure their Islamic civilizational interests? 
We have seen that the one procurable model, as discussed in chapter (1), is that of 
the traditional jurists. However, the juristic models have fixed their emphasis on the person 
of the ruler. Is the ruler pious, knowledgable, morally sound and upright in order to execute 
the trust of governing his subjects according to the will of God? Juristic political thinking did 
not attempt to elaborate on institutions of government, how they should be established, and 
on what principles they should be run. It was thought that a pious and just ruler, who 
fulfilled the commands of God, would be an example to his subjects, and would give rise to 
a citizenry that would be equally conscious of their obligation to God, and behave in a good 












as one of delegitimizing the existing status quo by which it found itself circumscribed. The 
other factor in the juristic model was its other-worldly emphasis; that the primary aim of the 
political process was to prepare the souls for everlasting bliss in the life hereafter. This 
model was extremely utopian in character. The overriding concern with Gemeinschaft 
(community) is also quite evident in their theories. 
The second option, that of secular liberal democracy, has been implemented by the 
majority of Muslim political elites currently in power in muslim lands. This option, which 
has been analyzed in chapter (2), is a product of. an important movement, the movement 
towards the secularization of politics and the separation of religion from politics. It was a 
movement which found its Muslim advocates in the form of Ataturk, Nasser, and Jinnah, 
who strongly felt that Muslim populations ought to practice Islamic religiosity to whatever 
extent they desired in their private lives, but should not allow that sentiment to impede socio-
economic and political development of the Muslim nations. It could be said that this approach 
was somewhat of a recognition of the Gesellschaft character of Muslim societies. 
The third and significant political paradigm that was discussed in chapter (3), which 
is even more radically utopian, was the Islamist paradigm as it took shape in the twentieth 
century. The principal notion of the Islamist paradigm was the sole sovereignty of Allah, as 
well as Allah's role as the sole legislator. Allah's role as legislator was exercised by the 
elected human representatives, who implement the will of Allah by adhering to the Qur'an 
and Sunnah, and by applying its immutable laws. 
As far as the Islamist utopia of the Islamists is concerned, it is based on the idea of 
creating a society that would uphold the sacred texts (Qur'an and Sunnah) in their moral life-
style. With regard to the rulers, the Islamist also focuses on the personality of the ruler. 












Sunnah, was considered worthy of governing the population, and was guaranteed power. In 
addition, however, the Islamists also emphasize the religious character of the institution of 
government as a whole. They accept the idea of a parliament made up of representatives 
elected by· the masses, albeit a parliament based on theocratic lines. 
The Islamists have attempted to challenge the notion of democracy as well as the way 
I it was implemented by the secular political elites. But what does democracy hold for Muslim 
populations? Democracy should be understood as a process. It is a process which allows for 
open debate, and transparency in decision making and in the running of affairs of state. 
Democracy is designed to be a system that demands accountability. It is tailor-made to 
provide checks and balances to ensure that power is not abused. 
What does democracy mean for Muslims particularly? The Qur'anic verse "(and 
I 
those) who conduct their affairs between them by mutual consultation (shura)" (ch. 42:38), 
while recommending mutual consultation, does not provide any specific framework as to how 
rulers should be chosen: by succession, by forceful usurpation of power, or by adult, 
universal franchise. Besides, the verse does not specifically refer to consultation in political 
matters. It speaks of consultation generally, whether it be applied between members of a 
' family with regard to private domestic affairs; between partners in business, or between 
I rulers and the ruled with regard to affairs of state. 
Modem experience demonstrates that democracy was founded precisely for the 
purposes of entrenching liberalism and freedom of thought, freedom of action, and freedom 
of conscience. By liberalism is mea.nt, total autonomy for human legislatures to legislate in 
such a way that the above mentioned freedoms could be guaranteed, providing they do not 
impinge on those same freedoms for others. Democracy was also a political programme that 












to coexist within a specific geopolitical area, without one religious· denomination or cultural 
group dominating another, or denying them social and political space commensurate with 
their numbers. 
However, these are precisely the problems that the Islamists have with Western-style 
democracy. They believe that liberal values and pluralism are incompatible with Islamic 
values. Islamists are of the belief that only the Islamic value-system (as conceived by them) 
can operate in a Muslim polity. Hence we find the persecution of the Copts by Islamists in 
Egypt. However, the early history of Islam belies the above tendency, for the classical 
Muslim polities including the Prophet, allowed non-Muslims living under the Islamic polity 
to conduct their worship (in their synagogues, monasteries and churches), their family life, 
and their business or commercial life according to their religious norms, without any 
interference from the Islamic order. In other words, they were granted independence with 
regard to their "private" affairs, providing they submitted in some measure to certain 
"public" norms and requirements; such as the payment of jizya (a form of tax), and the 
prohibition of some forms of dress in public. 
Contemporary Islamists also reject one-man dictatorships as well as hereditary rule 
(such as the Saudi monarchy). In this respect, the Islamists have adopted political modernism 
by advocating their own peculiar brand of 'democracy'. We have discussed that Islamists 
advocate democracy at the level of allowing for universal adult suffrage, which allows for 
mass participation in the electing of political leaders. In that instance, the Islamists effectively 
rule out dictatorships based on hereditary rule. However, where Islamists differ from liberal 
democracy, is in the extent to which a popularly elected Muslim government enjoys freedom 
of scope in the process of legislation. This is where the Islamists part company with the 












to the specific dictates of the Qur'an, and the Prophetic model. /jtiha.d, or original 
legislation, also has to be in conformity with the "general spirit" of the sacred law. It also 
has to conform to the explicit dictates of the sha.ri 'a, which are quite extensive. 
As far as the sociological reasons for the Islamists abhorrence of liberal democracy 
' 
is concerned, it has been outlined earlier, that the post-colonial conditions that prevailed in 
the Muslim world gave rise to a distrust of 'liberals' and 'democrats', or rather, the 'secular' 
rulers. Most sections of the Muslim populations were subject to repression, tyranny, and 
neglect, not only by their own governments, but also by the former colonial masters. The 
indigenous rulers were believed to be (and rightly so) surrogates of their colonial masters. 
It was the local rulers that made possible the unfair appropriation of the natural resources of 
Muslim lands, as well as the labour of its people. These former colonial powers were also 
believed to be guilty of destabilization of Muslim territories, especially born out by their 
continued support for the state of Israel despite its human rights record, and its maltreatment 
of the indigenous Palestinian people. The local rulers were believed to work only to secure 
their own privileges, and the interests of their mentors, the Western powers. 
At the global level, the problems that prompt the Islamists towards 'fundamentalism' 
is the continued hegemony of the Western powers. Besides the destabilization mentioned 
above, the Western mass media appears, in the eyes of ordinary Muslims, to be extremely 
hostile towards their values and traditions. In fact, there is a great deal of misunderstanding, 
and lack of empathy towards the real problems faced by Muslim populations, their grievances 
and their aspirations. 
Besides the economic and political reasons that provide an impetus to the rise of 
'fundamentalism', some people were primarily motivated by the moral corruption they 












concerned with the economic peril of imperialism and the problem of Muslim poverty. 
Instead, he was more concerned with the "modem corruptions entering into Muslim society 
as a result of the colonial impact." For him, modem corruption included, "democracy, 
participatfon of women in public affairs, and the secularization of culture." 1 Mawdudi' s main 
thrust was not on "achieving profane goals but on the spiritualization of worldly life. "2 
lslamists such as Mawdudi can be charged with being eclectic and selective in their 
citation of Qur'anic verses, Prophetic traditions, and juristic opinions, in substantiation of 
their theory of Islamic state, as has been demonstrated in the previous chapter. On the one 
hand, the Islamists advocate the sole sovereignty of God, and solicit holy texts in support of 
such a claim. On the other hand, they also advocate some sort of 'democratic caliphate' that 
could possibly combine the best of two worlds. This means that on the one hand, the 
Islamists wish to promote the 'modem' aspect of granting all the adult masses of a Muslim 
polity a say in choosing their rulers, but once the rulers are chosen, it is not human reason, 
human preferences, and social norms that are allowed to dictate the policies of government. 
The democratically elected leaders are to follow the shari 'a law as propounded by the jurists. 
This makes t:ije jurists a distinguished power elite who determine the course of Muslim 
destiny, since even the jurists arrive at their juridical decisions not untainted by their social 
surroundings, their peculiar prejudices, and their particular power interests. 
More importantly, despite the opportunities for practical reflection that were afforded 
by some instances of Islamic rule in countries such as Pakistan and Iran, the Islamists have 
yet to set forth clear ideas about how Islamic government should function. Their rhetoric 
which is directed now more than ever before to the unlearned masses, speaks only of what 
might be, and ignores the practical, procedural issues of how these goals are to be achieved 












how to provide prudent decisions once the goal of Islamic government has been achieved. 
Perhaps the failure to address such issues comes as a result of bearing an overriding concern 
with reaching the goal of Islamic government. 3 Thus we find contemporary Islamist 
movementS frequently calling for a restoration of the caliphate, as if it were the only 
religiously sanctioned manner of conferring legitimacy upon the ruler. 
This study has demonstrated how religion serves as a vehicle for social and political 
change. Religious resurgence is too complex an issue to be explained by providing simple 
causes. However, it has been established how the failure of secularism to address the serious 
socio-economic and political imbalances that exist in the Muslim world, has contributed to 
the proliferation of the lslamist vision of the 'true Islamic social and political order'. Added 
to that, the spiritual emptiness of secularism and modernity gave further impetus to the 
disillusioned Muslim masses. 
It has been pointed out in this study how the Islamists exercise a shrewd brand of 
selectivity. On the one hand, certain aspects of modernity are selectively appropriated, such 
as the skilful exploitation of modem technology like television, radio, and the modem media, 
while the philosophical and value-system underpinning modem technology is rejected. On 
the other hand, they selectively invoke the Islamic tradition in order to reiterate the socio-
economic and political goals they aspire to. 
It can be rightly said that the Islamists wish to re-enact the ideals of Gemeinschaft 
(community) within the context of a complex Gesellschaft (association/society) in which they 
find themselves. This ideal of recreating community is precisely the stimulus for the Islamist 
utopia. In its crusade to achieve this, Islamist absolutism has the potent potential to establish 
totalitarian states that are modernized only to the extent that they possess technological 












importantly, the Islamist approach to politics serves only to divest Muslims of the rich 
diversity of approaches their forbearers had adopted. It also deprives Muslims from 
continuing with that creative spirit, which is certainly the hallmark of their past heritage. 
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